BJ 

1241 
P7L.3 


UC-NRLF 


ID? 


.  .  .  THE  .  .  . 

Moral  Philosophy  of  Richard  Price 

AND  ITS  INFLUENCE. 

Being  a  Study  in  Ethics  both  Critical  and  Appreciative 
of  his  chief  work : 

A  Review  of  the  Principal  Questions  and 
Difficulties  in  Morals. 


A  Thesis  submitted  in  Partial  Fulfillment 

of  Requirements  for 
The  Doctorate  of  Philosophy 

at  the 

New  York  University, 
June,  1909. 


By  Enoch  Cook  Lavers,  A.M.,  Pd.D., 
Easton,  Pa. 


.  .  .  THE  .  .  . 

Moral  Philosophy  of  Richard  Price 

AND  ITS  INFLUENCE. 

Being  a  Study  in  Ethics  both  Critical  and  Appreciative 
of  his  chief  work : 

A  Review  of  the  Principal  Questions  and 
Difficulties  in  Morals. 


A  Thesis  submitted  in  Partial  Fulfillment 

of  Requirements  for 
The  Doctorate  of  Philosophy 

at  the 

New  York  University, 
June,  1909. 


By  Enoch  Cook  Lavers,  A.M.,  Pd.D., 
Easton,  Pa. 


Sanctae  memoriae  et  meae  matri  et  patris  mei,  omnibus  meis  gram- 
maticis  et  rhetoribus,  qui  mihi  principes  et  ad  suscipiendam  et  ingredi- 
endam  rationem  humanitatis  fuerent,  atque  Doctori  Carolo  Gray  Shaw 
et  Doctori  Roberto  McDougall  et  Doctori  Thomaso  M.  Balliett  et  Doc- 
tori  Jacobo  E.  Lough  quorum  praelectiones  philisophicas  audiri  maxima 
cum  gratia  haec  dissertatio  inscribitur. 


296263 


INDEX 


A— GENERAL  INTRODUCTION. 

a.  General   Statement    5 

b.  Definition  and  Origin  of  Different  Systems  of  Thought   5 

c.  Classification  of  Ethical  Theories    6 

d.  Historical  Situation  in  Eighteenth   Century    7 

e.  Sympathetic  Statement  of  Intuitionism    8 

B— THE  DOGMATIC  INTUITIONISM  OF  RICHARD  PRICE    10 

a.  Brief  Life  of  Price    10 

b.  Statement  of  Price's  System  of  Morals    11 

1.  Origin  of  Our  Ideas,  especially  of  Right  and  Wrong 12 

2.  Good  and  111  Desert— Merit  and  Demerit    14 

3.  Origin  of  Obligation  Coincides  with  Origin  of  Right   14 

4.  Origin  of  Desires  and  Affections    15 

5.  Virtue — 1.     Classification    of    Virtue 16 

2.  Absolute  and   Relative    17 

3.  Liberty,   Intelligence    17 

4.  Consciousness  of  Rectitude    17 

5.  Degrees  of  Virtue    17 

6.  Character 18 

7.  The  Beauty  of  Virtue    , 18 

6.  Relation  of  Morals  to  Natural  Religion 19 

C— CONCLUSIONS 19 

1.  Jouffroy    20 

2.  Watson    20 

3.  Evolutionist    21 

b— APPRECIATIONS 21 

1.  Martineau     21 

2.  Morrell     21 

3.  Jouffroy 21 

4.  Fowler 22 

c— PRESENT  STATUS  AND  OUTLOOK  22 

D— BIBLIOGRAPHY    


dbe  Moral  (pbilosopbp  of  IRicbarO  iprice 
anO  flts  Influence. 

By  ENOCH  COOK  LAYERS,  A.  M ,  Pd.D. 


As  compared  with  the  various  practi- 
cal sciences,  ethics  is  normative,  that  is, 
it  seeks  the  ideal  ends  of  life,  though  it 
does  not  confine  itself  to  ends  alone. 
Logic  holds  a  similar  position  in  specu- 
lative philosophy.  With  C.  G.  Shaw, 
"Life  must  be  regarded  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  ethical;  thought  must  be 
logical;  but  logic  and  ethics  similarly 
fail  to  contribute  to  human  living." 

To  attain  this  comprehensive  state- 
ment, ethics  has  struggled  up  through 
as  varied  and  as  conflicting  a  history 
as  any  of  the  branches  of  human  specula- 
tion. It  presented  itself  early  and  has 
persisted  since  the  days  of  Pythagoras. 
To  recount  earlier  or  later  theories  does 
not  pertain  to  our  problem.  A  critical 
estimate  of  Price's  chief  work  is  at-  ( 
tempted  from  a  sympathetic  standpoint, 
regarding  its  origin,  outgrowth  from  the! 
times,  and  place  in  ethical  development. 

The  philosophic  study  of  ethics  is  in 
general  partly  destructive  in  that  it 
criticises,  corrects,  supplements  and  clas- 
sifies the  distinctions  of  common  sense. 
Some  familiar  distinctions,  some  effete 
prohibitions  and  injunctions,  some  crude 
notions  of  the  nature  of  moral  autho- 
rity and  moral  sanctions,  together  with 
idiosyncracies  of  specific  systems  are 
outgrown  and  abandoned.  Moral  law, 
like  statute  law,  grows  by  constant  ac- 
cretion and  reconstruction.  Social  forms 
and  institutions  are  modified  accordingly. 
Science  is  critical  and  often  gives  appa- 
rently negative  results. 

Yet,  ethics  has  a  positive  and  recon- 
structive side.  It  seeks  not  to  explain 
away  but  to  establish  genuine  ideals  of 
duty  and  right.  Ethics  separates  the  es- 
sential from  the  unessential,  the  perma- 
nent from  the  transient,  the  spirit  from 
the  form  of  moral  and  social  institu- 
tions. The  truths  of  ethics  are  vitally 
related  to  those  of  aesthetics  and  reli- 
gion, and  of  .science  or  philosophy  in  gen- 
eral so  that  it  is  a  necessary  constituent 
of  man's  knowledge,  experience  and  pro- 
gress in  life, 


Especially  is  moral  philosophy  inviting 
to  the  student  and  thinker  when  a  sys- 
tem is  associated  with  a  vigorous  and 
charming  personality,  which  must  be  con- 
ceded in  the  case  of  Dr.  Richard  Price. 
The  work  we  are  to  consider  was  quite 
justly  regarded  by  the  advocates  of  ra- 
tional intuitionism  as  a  most  valuable 
performance.  Even  by  some  of  his  oppo- 
nents, it  was  admitted  to  be  the  most 
able  statement  of  the  defence  of  intui- 
tive principles  in  the  English  language 
up  to  his  day. 

Definition  and  Origin  of   Different  Sys- 
tems. 

Ethics  may  be  briefly  defined  as  the 
doctrine  of  human  conduct  and  character 
as  related  to  a  rational  ideal.  This  sci- 
ence assumes  as  its  basis,  the  fact  that 
men  are  prone  to  criticise  themselves 
and  others  and  cannot  help  admiring  in 
various  degrees  some  expressions  of  af- 
fection and  good  will  as  well  as  con- 
demning the  opposites.  This  tendency 
displays  itself  in  all  activities  of  life 
and  among  all  peoples.  The  origin  of  it 
all  is  in  a  consciousness  of  better  or 
worse  in  human  beings  and  affairs.  Peo- 
ple aspire  with  more  or  less  constancy 
and  distinctness  to  realize  the  good  and 
avoid  the  evil.  While  men  concede  that 
there  is  a  chasm  between  life  as  it  is 
and  as  it  ought  to  be,  the  great  masses 
seek  no  definite  standard,  investigate  no 
foundation  for  their  feeling,  but  they 
go  on  according  to  spontaneous  impulses, 
while  admiring  some  actions  and  con- 
demning others  they  see  or  perform.  A 
few  thoughtful  men  in  each  age  have 
sought  to  solve  the  problems  of  life 
with  varying  results. 

Different  views  about  ethical  facts  give 
rise  to  divergent  systems.  The  aim  of 
ethical  science  is  to  remove  whatever  is 
impulsive,  accidental  and  unreflective  in 
the  statement  of  these  facts,  to  trace 
them  to  their  ultimate  ground  in  our 
nature  and  the  universe  and  to  set  forth 
universally  the  ideal  of  individual  and 


social  perfection.  The  problems  of  ethics 
are  not  only  personal  but  also  social  and 
oven  racial.  To  introspection  must  be 
added  observation  and  comparison  to- 
gether with  the  historical  record.  Were 
a  purely  speculative  doctrine  of  ethics 
possible,  it  might  involve  the  investigator 
in  conclusions  wholly  false  respecting 
actual  conditions.  Environment  deter- 
mines opportunities  and  must  affect  du- 
ties as  well  as  the  possible  activity  of 
motives. 

Nature  and  God  are  man's  eternal  com- 
panions. The  most  opposite  schools  of 
opinion  arise  as  to  whether  the  external 
or  the  internal  is  first  considered — e.  g. 
realism  or  idealism.  The  former  leads 
to  determination,  the  latter  to  voluntar- 
ism with  all  the  discussions  of  freedom. 
The  former  follows  unpsychologic,  the 
latter  psychologic  method. 

The  intellectual  energy  of  the  period 
*-  of  English  thought  preceding  Price  had 
a  general  tendency  to  psychologic  rather 
than  ethical  method,  especially  in  Hart- 
"  ley,  Adam  Smith  and  Hume.  The  last 
sometimes  allowed  the  absorption  of  his 
ethics  into  psychology,  producing  con- 
fusion. Surprise  must  not  be  felt  if  it 
is  found  that  Price  is  also  unclear  psy- 
chologically at  times,  though  in  general, 
Price,  Reid  and  Stewart  reacted  against 
the  prevailing  tendency.  They  sought  to 
fall  back  upon  the  moral  principles  com- 
monly accepted,  affirming  their  objective 
validity  and  endeavoring  to  exhibit  them 
as  a  coherent  and  complete  set  of  ulti- 
mate ethical  truths. 

There  are  two  markedly  opposite  as- 
pects of  existence  that  which  appears  and 
that  which  is,  phenomena  and  reality. 
The  notion  of  something  permanent  as 
the  core  of  all  that  is  transient,  cannot 
be  separated  from  the  activities  of  the 
intellect  for  its  attribute  must  inhere 
in  substance.  Development  of  ethics 
hen-  gives  metaphysical  theories  similar 
1o  Plato,  Descartes  or  Malebranche  on 
the  one  side,  or  physical  like  Comte  on 
the  other. 

A>  the  standard  herein,  it  is  held  (*) 
1  hat  some  form  of  idealism  in  ethics  is 
Ilic  only  <-«msi-lrut  and  tenable  theory. 
Ilmiijui  ethical  ideals  must  have  their 
Around,  (heir  sanction,  and  their  goal, 
in  Hie  11:1  hire  of  ultimate  reality.  The 
facts,  opinions,  and  tendencies  with 

*Ladd  510,  et  511  seq.  condensed. 


which  the  philosophy  of  conduct  is  con- 
cerned, have  reference  to  human  ideals, 
as  covering  not  only  the  ethical,  but: 
harmonizing  with  the  aesthetical  and 
religious  nature  of  man.  Right  is  de-i 
fined  for  every  individual  and  for  every: 
age  by  the  fidelity  with  which  the  indi- 
vidual and  the  age  actualizes  in  conduct 
its  perpetually  growing  ideal.  The  spirit 
of  devotion  to  the  ideal  of  personal  be- 
ing in  social  relations  constitutes  the 
very  essence  of  ethical  Tightness.  Often 
the  ideal  appears  when  the  moral"  prob- 
lem appears  and  is  certainly  a  personal 
ideal,  involving  the  conception  of  the' 
life  of  moral  and  social  self -hood,  in  its' 
whole  range  of  constitutional  activities 
progressively  attaining  the  perfection  ofl 
its  being.  The  most  defensible  and  com- 
prehensive idealistic  theory  of  man's 
ethical  life  and  development  is  far 
enough  from  being  complete  in  itself. 
Human  notions  which  attach  a  kind  of 
absolute  and  unchanging  value  to  ac- 
tions, imply  the  expansion  of  conception- 
of  self -hood  into  an  absolute  self  where- 
in dwells  the  perfect  ideal,  and  who  is 
the  object  of  religious  faith,  contempla- 
tion and  service.  Human  morality  needs 
the  aid  of  religion  for  its  better  support 
and  more  effective  triumph  over  all  the 
weaknesses  and  temptations  which  as 
sault  and  try  the  very  foundations  upon 
which  it  reposes  its  rules  for  the  prac 
tical  life.  Light  shines  upon  the  ulti 
mate  problems  of  ethics  by  identifying 
the  ground  of  morality  with  the  world 
ground,  i.  e.,  considering  God  the  source 
of  moral  law,  its  sanctions,  and  its  de 
velopment;  and  also  by  justifying  the 
hope  that  the  ultimate  moral  ideal  wil 
be'  realized  in  the  full  establishment  o 
the  Divine  Kingdom — wherein  philosophj 
of  ethics  and  philosophy  of  religion  give 
mutual  support. 

Classification  of  Ethical  Theories. 

The  ethical  theories  of  the  great  sys 
tematic  thinkers,  whatever  their  genera, 
aim,  fit  but  imperfectly  into  any  logica 
classification,  yet  for  the  purpose  o 
placing  our  author  in  his  proper  rela 
tions.  such  a  plan  is  useful.  Herein  tw< 
grounds  of  classification  are  used:  (1 
Theories  which  depend  chiefly  upon  a  spe 
cial  view  of  the  ideal  end,  or  sumnun 
lonum.  (2)  Theories  which  start  fron 
the  mode  in  which  morality  is  appre 
hended  or  realized. 


As  to  ideal  or  highest  good,  Hedonism 
and  Perfection  may  be  named.  Accord- 
ing to  Hedonism,  pleasure  is  the  ultimate 
standard  (or  constituent)  of  moral  value, 
the  tendency  to  increase  pleasure  or  di- 
minish pain.  With  variations,  this  is 
common  to  the  ancients — Aristippus  of 
Cyrene,  Epicurus — and  to  the  moderns 
(1)  Egoists,  (2)  Altruists,  and  (3)  Utili- 
tarians. The  Egoists  claim  that  the 
standard  for  conduct  is  its  tendency  to- 
wards the  preservation,  interest  or  plea- 
sure of  the  individual  agent.  The  lead- 
ing Egoists  are  Hobbes,  Mandeville  and 
Schopenhauer.  The  latter  says  that  the 
mainspring  of  human  action  is  egoism, 
supplemented  by  the  hatred  or  the  mal- 
ice which  arises  through  egoistic  con- 
flicts. The  other  branch  of  modern  He- 
donism is  called  universalistic  because 
the  moral  end  is  the  greatest  pleasure 
of  mankind  generally.  This  includes  (1) 
the  altruists  who  profess  interest  in  oth- 
ers for  their  good  and  the  moral  end  of 
conduct,  and  (2)  the  utilitarians  who  re- 
gard adaptation  to  an  end  as  the  crite- 
rion of  moral  worth,  the  end  being  in- 
terpreted as  happiness.  To  this  denomi- 
nation has  of  late  been  added  the  great- 
est happiness  or  greatest  felicity  princi- 
ple. The  altruists  are  Comte,  (who  in-, 
vented  the  term)  Hutcheson,  Cumber- 
land, Shaftesbury.  ^ 

The   utilitarians   are   J.   S.  Mill,    (who 
invented  the  term  utilitarianism)  Locke, ' 
Hartley,  Hume,   Paley,  Bentham,  James 
Mill,  Bain,  Sidgwick,  Hodgson  and  Fow- 
ler. 

The  doctrines  of  Perfection  and  Self- 
Realization  in  so  far  as  distinct  from 
the  rationalistic  and  intuitional  ethics, 
may  be  said  to  date  from  Aristotle,  who 
maintained  that  the  chief  good  consisted 
in  an  activity  in  accordance  with  the 
highest  virtue  or  excellence.  The  theo- 
ries grouped  here  vary  greatly.  The  na- 
ture of  the  perfection  which  is  to  be  at- 
tained, or  the  self  which  is  to  be  realized, 
can  only  be  expounded  after  a  philosophi- 
cal inquiry,  and  the  ethical  doctrines  of 
Spinoza,  Leibnitz,  Fichte,  Hegel,  may  all 
be  included  here.  The  form  in  which 
the  notion  of  self  realization  appears  in 
contemporary  ethics  is  largely  due  to 
T.  H.  Green,  who  lays  special  stress  both 
upon  the  spiritual  or  rational  and  on 
the  social  nature  of  the  self.  Dewey, 
Mackenzie  and  Muirhead  have  also  been 
placed  here. 


The  second  great  group,  made  as  to 
the  mode  in  which  morality  is  appre- 
hended or  realized,  includes  the  intuition- 
ists  and  the  evolutionists.  According  to 
the  intuitional  or  autonomistic  view  of 
ethics,  the  end  of  conduct  consists  in  the 
correspondence  of  voluntary  activity  with 
certain  intuitively  recognized  moral 
rules.  This  view  has  its  historical  ante- 
cedent in  the  Stoic  doctrine  of  laws  of 
nature,  belonging  to  the  reason  of  the 
universe  and  apprehended  by  the  consub- 
stantial  reason  of  man.  The  same  doc- 
trine formulated  in  theological  terms 
led  to  the  dominant  systems  of  mediae- 
val ethics  in  the  related  doctrines  of  Syn- 
deresis  and  Conscience.  In  the  beginning 
of  English  philosophy  these  moral  first 
principles  were  regarded  as  principles  of 
the  sensus  communis  by  Herbert  of  Cher- 
bury;  and  he  may  accordingly  be  held 
to  be  the  founder  of  the  English  school 
of  intuitional  or  common-sense  morality. 
Thest?  intuitionists  include  (1)  the  Aes- 
thetic, (2)  the  Rational,  and  (3)  the 
Speculative. 

In    the    18th    century,   this    immediate     s 
apprehension  of  moral  value  was  inter- 
preted   as      aesthetic    by      Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson,  and  later  Adam  Smith  in  his 
doctrine  of   sympathy. 

The  rational,  or  "dogmatic"  interpre- 
tation of  the  moral  faculty  was  worked 
out  by  Cudworth,  Samuel  Clarke,  Butler, 
Price  and  Reid,  with  the  Scottish  school; 
and  also  the  French  school,  including 
Cousin,  Jouffroy  and  Janet. 

Speculative  or  philosophic  intuitionism 
reaches  a  complete  synthesis  of  moral 
law,  founded  upon  a  criticism  of  the  rea- 
son in  Kant.  His  followers  tend  rather 
to  the  perfectionist  than  the  traditional 
intuitional  ideal  but  Whewell,  Calder- 
wood,  McCosh  and  Martineau  are  classed 
here.  The  last  is  the  most  brilliant  and 
original  outcome  of  recent  intuitional 
doctrine. 

The  evolutionists  seek  to  develop  the 
moral  from  that  which  is  unmoral,  and  v 
a  naturalistic  theory  of  volition.  At  first 
the  theory  of  evolution  was  associated 
with  the  Hedonistic  theory.  Modifica- 
tions were  soon  made  by  Spencer,  while 
Stephen  and  others  have  attempted  a 
more  specific  evolutionist  ethics.  By 
these  writers,  some  such  conception  as 
social  vitality  has  often  been  taken  as 
the  ethical  ideal ;  but  the  most  valuable 
part  of  their  work  has  been  in  tracing 


the  genesis  and  progress  of  morality 
both  historically  and  in  the  individual, 
rather  than  in  contributions  towards  the 
solution  of  the  question  of  the  ultimate 
conditions  of  moral  value.  The  princi- 
pal authors  are  Darwin,  Simcox,  Spen- 
cer, L.  Stephen,  Rolph,  Hoffding,  S.  Alex- 
ander, Wundt^  Simmel,  Baldwin,  Lorley, 
and  CliffonT 

A  Sympathetic  Statement  of  Intuition- 
ism. 

Intuition  is  that  power  of  the  mind 
which  gives  ideas  and  truths  not  fur- 
nished by  the  senses  nor  elaborated  by  the 
understanding  as  judgment  or  reasoning. 
Its  products  are  primary  ideas  such  as 
space,  time,  cause,  identity,  the  true,  the 
beautiful  and  the  good,  and  primary 
truths  such  as  the  axioms  of  mathema- 
tics. These  ideas  are  not  notions  of 
sensible  objects  but  are  awakened  in  the 
mind  by  means  of  sensible  objects  which 
are  the  occasion  but  not  the  cause  of 
these  ideas.  Their  origin  must  be  at- 
tributed to  a  special  power  of  the  mind 
by  virtue  of  which  under  appropriate  cir- 
cumstances it  conceives  these  truths  and 
ideas  when  the  power  is  called  origina- 
tive or  intuitive.  Its  specific  character 
is  distinct  from  any  other  power,  being 
neither  presentative  nor  representative 
but  a  power  of  simple  and  immediate 
conception,  not  reflective,  yet  its  objects 
are  conceived  as  realistic.  Under  differ- 
ent names  it  is  the  doctrine  substantially 
of  Reid,  Stewart,  Brown,  Cudworth, 
Clarke,  Butler,  Price,  among  British  met- 
aphysicians; Kant  and  his  disciples  in 
Germany;  Cousin,  Jouffrey,  Janet  and 
others  in  France.  It  is  denied  by  Hobbes, 
Locke,  Condillac,  Gassendi,  and  others 
who  trace  all  our  ideas  to  sense  as  their 
ultimate  source. 

Universally  Prevalent. 

When  attention  is  directed  to  the  vol- 
untary action  of  any  intelligent  rational 
being,  man  finds  himself  not  unfrequent- 
ly  passing  upon  its  character  as  right 
or  wrong.  Different  individuals  may  vary 
as  to  correctness,  clearness  or  strength 
of  impression,  but  in  all  minds  the  idea 
of  right  and  wrong  finds  a  place,  and 
the  understanding  applies  it  to  par- 
ticular instances  of  conduct. 

The  origin  of  these  ideas  of  right 
and  wrong  has  been  attributed  to  edu- 
cation and  fashion,  legal  restriction,  a 
special  sense,  an  exercise  of  judgment, 


(evolution),  or  to  natural  intuitions  of 
the  mind.  Education  or  imitation  and 
legal  enactment  presuppose  the  existence 
of  moral  ideas  and  distinction.  * — 1 

The  theory  of  a  special  moral  sense 
seems  to  make  morality  a  mere  senti- 
ment, only  a  matter  of  feeling.  Moral 
distinctions,  according  to  this  view,  are 
only  merely  subjective  affections  of  our 
minds,  and  not  independent  realities. 
Hume  carries  this  general  view  out  to  its 
legitimate  results,  making  morality  a 
mere  relation  between  our  nature  and 
certain  objects.  Thus  virtue  and  vice 
like  color  and  taste,  lie  merely  in  our 
sensations.  The  Sophists  long  previous- 
ly advanced  these  skeptical  views,  and 
taught  that  man  is  the  measure  of  all 
things,  that  things  are  only  what  they 
seem  to  us.  Hutcheson  used  the  term 
sense  in  an  ambiguous  manner,  some- 
times to  denote  a  perceptive  power, 
which  might  be  considered  correct,  but 
more  generally  to  denote  some  adapta- 
tion of  the  sensibilities  to  receive  im- 
pressions from  without.  There  is  no 
evidence  of  such  a  moral  sense;  indeed, 
facts  contradict  such  a  belief.  There  is 
no  uniformity  of  moral  impressions  or 
sensation  as  ought  to  be  manifest  on 
such  a  supposition.  Man's  eyes  and  ears 
are  much  alike  in  their  activity,  the 
world  over;  but  it  is  otherwise  with  the 
operation  of  this  so-called  moral  sense. 
While  all  men  have,  probably,  some  idea 
of  right  and  wrong,  there  is  the  greatest 
possible  variety  in  its  application  to 
particular  instances  of  conduct. 

Judgment. 

The  judgment  does  not  originate  ideas 
for  it  compares,  distributes,  estimates, 
decides  to  what  class  or  category  a  thing 
belongs  but  creates  nothing.  Given  idea, 
as  of  right  and  wrong,  the  judgment 
decides  as  to  the  moral  character  of 
particular  actions. 

Intuitive. 

Ideas  of  right  and  wrong  are  intuitive ; 
i.  e.,  suggestions  or  perceptions  of  rea- 
son, a  variety  of  the  understanding.  It 
is  the  office  of  reason  to  discern  right 
and  wrong,  as  well  as  the  true  and  the 
false,  or  the  beautiful  and  the  ugly. 
The  idea  of  the  right  is  a  cognition  in 
relation  to  the  actions  of  rational  beings. 
In  contemplation  of  certain  personal  ac- 

*— 1  P.  305, 


8 


He  says  that  the  practical  errors  of  men 
have  "plainly  arisen  from  their  specu- 
lative errors;  from  their  mistaking 
facts,  or  not  seeing  the  whole  of  a  case. 
There  are  errors  of  judgment,  imagina- 
tion and  reasoning.  Men  would  not 
claim  that  other  men  have  no  specula- 
tive reasoning  powers  because  they  arrive 
at  false  opinions.  He  even  admits  that 
education,  custom  and  prejudice  all 
darken  the  action  of  the  royal  reason, 
and  moral  judgments  differ  with  age 
and  circumstances,  which  certainly  wea- 
kens the  intuitional  theory. 

In  the  eighth  chapter,  Price  makes 
the  distinction  between  Abstract  or  Ab- 
solute Virtue  and  Practical  or  Relative 
Virtue.  He  says,  "Abstract  Virtue  is, 
most  properly,  a  quality  of  the  external 
action  or  event.  It  denotes  what  an 
action  is,  considered  independently  of 
the  sense  of  the  agent;  or  what,  in 
itself  and  absolutely,  it  is  right  such  an 
agent,  in  such  circumstances,  should 
do;  and  what,  if  he  judged  truly,  he 
would  judge  he  ought  to  do.  Practical 
Virtue,  on  the  contrary,  has  a  necessary 
relation  to,  and  a  dependence  upon,  the 
opinion  of  the  agent  concerning  his 
actions.  It  signifies  what,  it  is  true  he 
ought  to  do,  upon  supposition  of  his 
having  such  and  such  sentiments.  Obli- 
gations have  a  real  existence  indepen- 
dent of  men's  judgments,  yet  in  accord- 
ance with  our  author,  "there  is  a  sense 
in  which,  what  any  being,  in  the  sin- 
cerity of  his  heart,  thinks  he  ought  to 
do."  (* — 1)  Now  we  submit  this  depends 
upon  whether  the  individual  has  in- 
fofmed  himself  as  well  as  possible  as  to 
his  duty.  Of  course,  "Our  rule  is  to 
follow  our  consciences  steadily  and 
faithfully,  after  we  have  taken  care 
to  inform  them  in  the  best  manner  we 
*  can."  (• — 2)  But  do  the  two  quotations 
agree?  Here  the  author  discusses  rights 
of  conscience  in  a  very  fair  manner. 

Practical  virtue  presupposes  freedom 
of  the  will  or  liberty.  Price  disposes  of 
this  monumental  problem  quite  sum- 
marily. "Virtue  supposes  determination, 
and  determination  supposes  a  determin- 
er; and  a  determiner  that  determines 
not  himself,  is  a  palpable  contradiction. 
Determination  requires  an  efficient 
cause.  If  this  cause  is  the  being  him- 

*— 1  Review  of  Morals  P.  294 
*— 2  Review  of  Morals  P.  302 


self,  I  plead  for  no  more;  if  not,  then 
it  is  no  longer  his  determination ;  that 
is,  he  is  no  longer  the  determiner,  but 
the  motive,  or  whatever  else  any  one  will 
maintain  to  be  the  cause  of  the  deter- 
mination." (* — 3)  It  has  always  been  the 
general  as  well  as  the  natural  sense  of 
mankind,  that  they  cannot  be  account- 
able for  what  they  have  no  power  to 
avoid.  The  discussion  is  too  brief  to 
have  its  full  weight,  undoubtedly. 

Intelligence  is  a  second  requisite  of 
practical  morality.  Some  degrees  of 
knowledge  of  moral  good  and  evil  is 
necessary  to  moral  agency. 

Thirdly,  Oonsciousness  of  rectitude  is  ___ 
necessary  to  virtuous  acts,  and  this  con- 
sciousness must  be  the  rule  and  end. 
Otherwise  there  would  be  no  recognition 
of  right  actually  in  character.  Indeed, 
perception  of  right  and  wrong,  does 
excite  to  action,  and  is  alone  a  sufficient 
principle  of  action.  It  is  the  supreme 
motive,  but  to  how  many  relatively  does 
it  appeal?  Surely  only  to  a  small  pro- 
portion of  human  beings,  because  they 
cannot  appreciate  abstract  motives. 
There  must  be  some  concrete  motive. 
Price's  arguments  are  mostly  convinc- 
ing to  those  of  philosophic  bent,  yet 
there  are  many  springs  to  action  upon 
which  he  does  not  touch  which  appeal 
to  the  common  mind  more  convincingly. 
Reference  may  be  made  to  Martineau's 
table  for  example,  p.  266,  ''.types  of 
Ethical  Theory,"  noting  the  careful  an- 
alysis and  close  discrimination. 

Price  says,  "The  degree  or  regard,  or 
disregard,  of  attachment  to  truth  and 

rectitude,  or  want  of  attachment  to  the  \ - 

same,  evinced  by  actions,  is  what  deter- 
mines the  judgment  we  make  of  the 
degree  of  moral  good  and  evil  in  them." 
(* — 4)  External  actions  are  considered  as  ! 
signs  of  motives  and  views  of  men.  In  T 
general  the  latter  can  be  inferred  from 
the  former  with  sufficient  certainty,  but 
when  this  is  impracticable,  the  merit  or 
demerit  of  actions  cannot  be  safely 
judged.  Doing  a  good  act  with  little 
temptation  to  omit  is  of  little  virtue. 
When  interests  prompt  to  good  deeds, 
they  are  virtuous  just  to  the  extent 
they  are  prompted  by  conscious  influ- 
ence of  its  rectitude,  which  is  not  gen- 
erally to  a  high  degree.  When  difficul- 

*— 3  Review  of  Morals  P.  297 
*~k  Review  of  Morals  P.  334 


17 


ties  are  surmunted,  credit  is  due  to  the 
proportion  effort  has  been  used.  Virtue 
is  the  greatest  when  all  temptations 
are  opposed,  when  a  man  is  ready  to 
follow  wherever  virtue  leads,  shrinking 
from  every  appearance  of  wrong,  feeling 
such  a  horror  at  guilt  as  to  dread  all 
the  approaches  thereto. 

Price  states  oppositely  with  respect 
to  vice.  All  of  which  is  of  but  small 
additional  value.  There  has  been  little 
practical  outcome  from  any  scheme  of  a 
calculus  of  virtue  or  of  vice.  Generally 
they  are  more  ingenious  than  useful. 

Price  further  on  recognizes  the  weak- 
ness in  a  system  for  estimating  the 
amount  of  virtue  in  actions  as  follows: 
"It  may  be  worth  observing,  how  very 
deficient  Hutcheson's  manner  of  com- 
puting the  morality  of  actions  is.  For 
this  purpose  he  gives  us  this  Canon, 
'The  virtue  is  as  the  moment  of  good 
produced,  diminished  or  increased,  by 
the  private  interest,  concurring  with  or 
opposing  it,  divided  by  the  ability.' 
*  *  *  *  Some  of  the  noblest  acts  of 
virtue,  and  worst  acts  of  wickedness 
not  being  viewed  as  the  means  of  any 
moment  of  good,  or  of  misery,  must  ac- 
cording to  the  foregoing  carion,  be  whol- 
ly indifferent." 

\  Character   does  not  even  depend  upon 

the  amount  of  temptation  overcome. 
Difficulties  and  inconveniences  attend- 
ing virtuous  conduct  are  but  the  means 
of  showing  to  others,  who  cannot  see 
immediately  into  our  hearts,  what  our 
moral  temper  is.  On  the  other  hand 
difficulties  and  temptations  often  cause 
very  great  evils  and  disadvantages  for 
they  may  overwhelm  and  ruin  the  vir- 
tuous person,  who  may  get  no  credit  for 
the  struggle.  The  moral  culture  of 
mankind  implies  just  this  warfare,  how- 
ever. Frequently,  too,  the  difficulties 
mot  by  a  virtuous  agent  only  save  to 
display  the  defects  of  his  character. 

After  some  divergent  observations  of 
really  quite  interesting  nature,  Price 
goes  on  to  state  the  essentials  of  a  good 
character.  Man  should  be  reasonable 
and  disposed  to  be  governed  by  rectitude. 
The  sources  of  vice  are  the  inferior  pro- 
pensities  and  appetites.  The  reflective 
principle  being  found  in  different  de- 
grees, diameter  is  generally  stronger 
;is  reflection  more  carefully  examines, 
judges,  directs,  controls.  Reason  should 
yield  to  nothing  else  whatsoever  but 
model  and  superintend  the  whole 


life.  In  the  pre-eminence  of  reason  is 
found  the  supremacy  of  the  moral  fac- 
ulty and  the  possibility  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  noblest  character.  Price 
sums  up:  "If  then  we  would  know 
our  own  characters,  and  determine  to 
which  class  of  men  we  belong,  the  good 
or  the  bad,  we  must  compare  our 
regard  to  everlasting  truth  and 
righteousness  with  our  regard  to 
friends,  credit,  pleasure  and  life,  our 
love  of  God  and  moral  excellence  with 
our  love  of  inferior  objects,  the  domin- 
ion of  reason  with  the  force  of  appetite, 
and  find  which  prevail. 
It  is  the  ruling  passion  that  dominates 
the  character.  The  ruling  love  of  pow- 
er, fame,  and  distinction,  denominates  a 
man  ambitious;  the  ruling  love  of  plea- 
sure, a  man  of  pleasure;  of  money,  a 
covetous  man.  And,  in  like  manner,  the 
ruling  love  of  God,  of  our  fellow-crea- 
tures, and  of  rectitude  and  truth,  de- 
nominates a  man  virtuous."  (* — 1) 

There  remain  a  variety  of  observations 
in  this  chapter  well  suited  to  a  homily. 
One  criterion  of  a  good  character  not  to 
be  overlooked  is  ^constant  endeavor  to 
improve.  True  goodness  must  be  a 
(jroinng  thing.  All  habits  by  time  and 
exercise  gain  strength. 

Price's  ideas  of  the  beauty  and  defor- 
mity of  actions  are  extremely  sugges- 
tive. Some  actions  are  amiable ;  others 
are  wrong  not  only,  but  perhaps  odious, 
shocking,  vile.  These  terms  express  ef- 
fects in  the  observer  not  qualities  in  the 
action.  These  effects  arise  from  the 
nature  of  things,  owing  to  the  consti- 
tution of  the  universe.  An  essential 
congruity  exists  between  man's  intellect 
and  feelings  on  one  side  and  moral  ac- 
tivities on  the  other,  so  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  behold  a  good  action  without 
love  or  respect  arising  toward  the 
agent.  Agreeable  feelings  oi'  order,  util- 
ity, peace  of  mind,  or  affection  come  in 
process  of  time  to  be  associated  with 
virtuous  conduct.  Those  qualities  in 
good  actions  which  excite  these  agree- 
able feelings  in  the  mind  of  the  spec- 
tator form  what  some  moralists  have 
called  the  J>cauti/  of  virtue. 

Intuitions  of  right  and  beauty  are- 
distinct  but  mutually  helpful,  except  in 
extreme  cases,  and  should  be  made  re- 
ciprocally supporting.  "Do  you  ima- 
gine," says  Socrates  to  Aristippus,  "that 


*— 1   Review   Morals  PP.   364-365 


18 


tions,  an  ethical  element  is  immediately 
perceived;  and  the  acts  are  pronounced 
right  or  wrong  accordingly.  The  idea 
of  right  or  wrong  is  never  applied  to  the 
action  of  a  brute  animal,  nor  to  an  inan- 
imate object  of  nature. 

Accompaniments. 

Two  ideas  accompanied  by  feelings 
grow  out  of  the  idea  of  the  right:  these 
are  the  notions  of  obligation  and  of 
merit  and  demerit.  The  idea  of  obliga- 
tion grows  immediately  out  of  the  idea 
of  the  right.  As  soon  as  an  action  is 
known  to  be  right,  the  cognition  springs 
up  that  it  ought  to  be  done;  as  soon  as 
it  is  cognized  that  an  action  is  wrong, 
then  arises  the  idea  that  it  should  not 
be  done.  These  ideas  of  the  ought  and 
I l.o  ought  nol  are  called  the  ideas  of 
obligation. 

Following  the  doing  or  not  doing  of 
an  action  comes  the  idea  of  merit  or  de- 
merit. We  condemn  ourselves  for  the 
neglect  or  violation  of  moral  duty;  we 
censure  others  for  doing  wrong  or  failing 
to  do  right.  The  entire  code  of  social  or- 
der and  government  is  based  upon  this 
idea. 

Nature  of  the  Right. 
The  right  is  not  a  mere  idea ;  it  is  also 
1  a  reality.  An  action  is  not  right  or 
wrong  merely  because  men  think  it  so; 
men  think  it  right  or  wrong  because  it 
is  so.  The  right  and  wrong  are  realities, 
essential  attributes  of  voluntary  actions. 
These  realities  are  eternal  and  fixed  in 
their  nature;  they  cannot  be  changed 
or  annihilated.  The  question  in  what 
the  right  consists,  has  been  answered 
by  different  theories:  (1)  Highest  Hap- 
piness; (2)  Utility;  (3)  Legal  Enact- 
ment; (4)  Divine  Law;  (5)  The  Divine 
.  Mature;  and  (6)  The  Eternal  Nature  of 
Things. 

The  ethical  theories  may  be  classified 
more  closely  into —  . 

1.  Theories  which  depend  upon  a  spe- 
cial view  of  the  ideal  end,  or  sumnum 
bonum. 

a.  Various   forms    of   Hedonism   which 
agree    in    maintaining    that    a    pleasant 
feeling  is  the  ultimate  standard  of  moral 
value. 

b.  Doctrines    of   Perfection   or    Self-re- 
alization  according   to   which   the   moral 
idea  is  a  perfection  of  character  (Hikok) 
or   a  complete   and  harmonious  develop- 
ment of  personal  capabilities. 


2.  Theories  which  start  from  the  way 
in  which  morality  is  apprehended  or  re- 
alized. 

c.  Intuitionism.      1.  Asthetic.      2.    Per- 
ceptional   or    Dogmatic — Price.      3.    Ra- 
tional— Kant. 

d.  Empiricism,  which  when  not  hedon- 
istic, connects  itself  with  some  theory  of 
evolution. 

Hedonism. 

Some  philosophers  hold  that  the  ground 
of  the  right  is  in  securing  the  highest 
happiness  of  the  individual.  Any  action 
which  contributes  to  the  highest  happi- 
ness of  a  person  is  right  according  to 
this  theory,  and  it  is  right  merely  be- 
cause it  does  thus  contribute  to  his  hap- 
piness. Anything  which  detracts  from 
man's  happiness  is  wrong,  and  it  is  so 
merely  because  it  diminishes  his  enjoy- 
ment. Happiness,  or  the  welfare  of  the 
individual,  is  the  test  of  moral  actions, 
and  determines  all  the  moral  quality 
which  they  possess. 

The  great  objection  to  Hedonism  in  its 
baldest  form  is  that  it  makes  virtue  and 
happiness  identical  and  thus  contradicts 
the  consciousness  of  mankind.  Every 
person  distinguishes  between  that  which 
gives  pleasure  and  that  which  is  right, 
recognizing  that  many  kinds  of  pleasure 
are  clearly  entirly  wrong.  Besides,  men 
often  do  the  right  because  it  is  right, 
even  at  the  sacrifice  of  happiness. 

While  Hedonism  became  a  fairly  con- 
sistent view  of  life,  it  lacked  depth.  Its 
ideas  of  pleasure  and  desire,  of  happi- 
ness and  health,  of  prudence  and  benev- 
olence are  all  incomplete  and  fall  below 
the  plane  of  the  noblest  ethical  truth. 
With  much  shifting  of  base,  Hedonists 
have  practically  admitted  that  men  do 
not  actually  regard  the  preference  of  mo- 
rally right  conduct  as  identical  with  the 
choice  of  the  course  which  seems  to 
bring  the  maximum  of  mere  happiness. 
They  admit  that  men  do  not  regard 
themselves  as  obligated  to  seek  happi- 
ness, nor  make  it  a  matter  of  conscience. 
The  admission  has  also  been  made  that 
in  the  practical  reason  of  mankind,  the 
ideal  of  happiness  and  the  ideal  of  a 
human  being  doing  duty  faithfully  are 
not  identical  ideas. 

Standard  for  Intuitionism. 
Right  and  wrong  are  ultimate  or  first 
principles.      It    is    impossible    to    sepa- 
rate them  from  the  nature  of   God — or 


the  world-ground,  an  ethical,  personal 
spirit — for  lie  i>  also  eternal  and  immu- 
table. Their  source  is  in  the  nature  of 
Cod  as  the  ultimate  reality,  and  the  ori- 
ginator of  tlic  nature  of  things;  hence, 
they  a iv  coexistent  with  God  and  the 
universe.  .Neither  God  nor  the  right 
can  IM-  conceived  to  change.  Neither  was 
created,  and  neither  can  be  destroyed. 
Logically  only  is  the  nature  of  the  right 
separate  from  the  nature  of  God,  and 
only  thus  can  man  sit  in  judgment  upon 
his  laws  and  predicate  holiness  of  his  na- 
ture and  actions.  In  this  way,  there  is 
a  forceful  meaning  in  "Shall  not  the 
.Judge  of  all  the  earth  do  right?"  and 
••Th<-  Law  of  the  Lord  is  perfect." 

By  intuitionism  the  ethical  has  been 
dignified,  but  in  attempting  to  attain  a 
universal  rule  of  conduct  self-contradic- 
tion and  practical  difficulty  have  result- 
ed, leaving  us  with  only  a  statement  of 
relative  values.  Green  admitted  that 
ethical  principles  as  such  were  only  "for- 
mulative  and  influential."  Shaw  says, 
"Here  consists  the  condemnation  of  In- 
tuitionism. As  a  theory  it  leads  no- 
where, produces  no  fruit,  accomplishes 
no  result."  Hobhouse  says  of  intuition- 
ism.  "It  is  an  easy  theory,  but  fortu- 
nately it  is  not  true,  and  if  it  were  it 
would  not  explain  anything." 

Critique  of  the  Moral  Philosophy  of  Dr. 

Richard     Price — Introduction     to     His 

Work. 

Price  thinks  critics  should  enjoy  liber- 
ty to  pronounce  their  opinions  "concern- 
ing the  merit  of  books"  and  that  the  au- 
thors of  said  books  should  not  be  "at  all 
disposed  to  be  out  of  humor  with  critics 
nor  the  consequences  of  their  criticisms." 
Critics  should  take  more  time  to  consider 
and  examine  than  they  generally  do, 
otherwise  they  are  correct  only  by  chance 
and  an-  guided  by  prejudice  or  pre-con- 
ceived  opinions.  Men  are  governed  in 
forming  these  opinions  by  "their  tem- 
per-, by  interesi.  by  humor,  and  passion, 
and  a  thousand  nameless  causes,  which 
render  it  impossible  for  them  not  to 
err."  There  are  in  truth  none  who  are 
ien  of  that  cool  and  dispassionate 
temper,  that  freedom  from  all  wrong 
biases,  that  habit  of  attention  and  pa- 
tience of  thought,  and,  withal,  that  pen- 
etration and  sa'jai'ily  of  mind,  which  are 
securities  against  error,  and  the 


necessary  qualifications  in  finding  out 
truth.  *— 1 

Though  seeking  the  modesty  and  diffi- 
dence recommended  by  Price  we  are  still 
backward  to  approach  the  work  of  writ- 
ing a  critique  and  appreciation  of  the 
work  entitled  "A  Review  of  the  Princi- 
pal Questions  and  Difficulties  in 
Morals." 

Aim.  Price  states  his  purpose  as  fol- 
,lows:  "What  I  have  had  chiefly  in  view 
has  been  to  fix  the  foundation  of  mor- 
als, or  to  trace  virtue  up  to  truth  and 
the  nature  of  things,  and  these  to  the 
Deity." 

His  Life.  a.  Antecedents.  The  fath- 
er of  Richard  Price  was  a  minister  to  a 
congregation  of  Protestant  Dissenters  at 
Bridgend,  in  Glamorganshire,  Wales,  and 
so  deeply  was  the  elder  Price  tinctured 
with  austere  Calvanistic  principles,  that 
the  liberal  and  enlightened  spirit  which 
the  famous  son  displayed  mostly 
throughout  life  was  developed  according 
to  the  principles  of  opposites,  though 
the  latter  occasionally  gave  way  to  the 
same  spirit  as  the  father  as  in  hig 
preaching  of  annihilation  for  the  wicked. 
The  father  was  a  bigoted  Calvanist,  a 
person  of  morose  temperament. 

b.  The    generally    most    amiable    phil- 
osopher, minister  and  author,  who  is  to 
be  briefly  sketched  herein,  was  born  on 
February    23,    1723,    at    Tynton,    in    the 
parish    of    Llangeinor,    County    of    Gla- 
morganshire. 

c.  Education.     The  education  of  Rich-, 
ard   Price  was  conducted  partly  by  pri- 
vate    tutors,     and     partly  .  at     private 
schools,   where   he   devoted  himself   with 
ardour  to  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  and 
obtained   great   proficiency   both   in    ma- 
thematics   and   theology.        In   the    year 
17UO    he    received    the    degree    of    D.    D. 
from  the  University  of  Glasgow.     Out  of 
respect    to    the    author's    extraordinary 
merit  as  shown  in  the  work  on  Morals, 
the    University    of    Aberdeen,    in     1769, 
presented  him  with  the  diploma  of  doc- 
tor of  divinity.       Also  in  1783,  the  de- 
gree   of    L.    L.    D.    was    conferred    upon 
him    by    Yale    college    in   appreciation   of 
bis    works    on    political    liberty,    and    he 
was    afterward   elected   a    fellow    of   the 
American  philosophical  societies  at  Phil- 
adelphia and  Boston. 

*— 1  P.  3  Rev.  Morals. 


The  books  which  he  read  were  select 
rather  than  numerous,  yet  he  was  fa- 
miliar with  the  philosophy  of  the  an- 
cients, including  Plato,  Aristotle,  Cice- 
ro, Tully — and  among  the  moderns, 
Cudworth,  Balguy,  Hume,  Malebranche, 
Hutcheson,  Warburton,  Wollaston,  But- 
ler, Berkeley  and  Reid. 

d.  Vocation.         Having      accomplished 
his  formal   education  at  the  academy  in 
London.   Price  resided  as  Chaplain  near- 
ly thirteen  years   in   the   family  of   Mr. 
Streatfield    at     Stoke-Xewington.       Sub- 
sequently   he    officiated    in    various    dis- 
senting  congregations    as    minister    with 
the    duties   of   which    office    he    was    de- 
voutly impressed.      When  discouraged  by 
the  apathy  of  his  auditors,  he  gave  up 
preaching   altogether,   and  took  to   writ- 
ing  sermons   for   the   press  and   superin- 
tended  the  publication   of  the 'works  of 
Isaac  Xewton. 

e.  Works  and  their  immediate  effects. 
Richard      Price     moved     to     Newington 
("ireen  in  the  year   1758,  having  married 
a   Miss    Sarah   Bhindell    in   the   previous 
year.      At    this    time    he    published    his 
most    famous    philosophical    treatise,    "A 
Review    of    the    Principal    Questions    and 
Difficulties  in  Morals,"  which  introduced 
him   to    many    persons    of   literary    emi- 
nence,  among  whom   were:     Dr.  Adams, 
of  Pembroke  College,  Oxford;  Dr.  Doug- 
lass, the  late  Bishop  of  Salisbury;    and 
to  David   Hume.     In    1767   he    published 
a  volume  of  sermons,  including  his  vig- 
orous ideas  relative  to  the  future  state, 
which  attracted  the  attention  and  gain- 
ed  the  acquaintance   of   Lord   Shelburne, 
an   event    which    had   much    influence    in 
raising  his   reputation,   and   determining 
the  character  of  his  subsequent  pursuits. 

Price  was  destined  to  be  known  in  his' 
own  times  more  as  a  writer  on  insur- 
ance, finance  and  political  matters  than 
merely  as  a  minister  or  even  as  a 
philosopher.  In  1760  he  wrote  some 
observations,  addressed  in  a  letter  to 
Dr.  Franklin  on  the  expectation  of 
lives,  the  increase  of  mankind,  and  the 
population  of  London,  which  were  pub- 
lished in  the  Philosophical  Transactions, 
with  later  observations  upon  the  proper 
method  of  calculating  the  values  of 
contingent  reversions.  These  publica- 
tions are  said  to  have  exercised  a  most 
beneficial  influence  in  correcting  inade- 
quate calculations  used  in  insurance  and 
benefit  societies. 


Price's  ardent  love  for  civil  and  reli- 
gious liberty  led  to  political  pamphlets, 
and  in  1776  he  published  "Obser- 
vations on  Civil  Liberty  and  the  Justice 
and  Policy  of  the  War  with  America." 
This  led  to  great  discussion  and  in  re- 
cognition of  his  services  in  the  cause 
of  liberty,  Price  was  presented  with  the 
freedom  of  the  City  of  London. 

f.  Friends  and  Associates.  At  this  time 
he  was  the  intimate  friend  of  Franklin: 
he  corresponded  with  Turgot ;  ancr'  in 
the  winter  of  1778,  he  was  invited  by 
Congress  to  come  to  America  to  assist 
in  the  financial  administration  of  the 
new  government.  One  of  Price's  most 
intimate  friends  was  the  celebrated  Dr. 
Priestley,  with  whom  he  corresponded 
in  discussion  of  the  great  questions  of 
morals  'and  metaphysics.  In  1778  the 
views  of  these  two  liberal  theologians 
on  the  subjects  of  materialism  and  ne- 
cessity were  published,  wherein  Price 
maintained,  in  opposition  to  Priestley, 
the  free  agency  of  man  together  with 
the  unity  and  immortality  of  the  hu- 
man soul. 

Price  had  distinguished  abilities  as 
a  mathematical,  moral  and  political 
writer.  He  had  a  neat  and  perspicuous 
style.  His  manner  was  natural,  kindly 
and  unaffected.  His  private  character 
was  not  only  irreproachable,  but  highly 
exemplary  and  amiable.  He  was  an  af- 
fectionate and  generous  brother,  a  lov- 
ing and  attentive  husband.  His  talents 
and  his  labors  were  ever  at  the  call  of 
friendship.  In  the  practice  of  all  his 
virtues,  he  was  utterly  devoid  of  osten- 
tation. His  countenance  was  philan- 
thropic and  when  lighted  up  in  conver- 
sation it  assumed  an  aspect  peculiarly 
pleasing.  His  person  was  slender  and 
rather  below  the  common  size,  but  was 
possessed  of  great  muscular  strength,  as 
well  as  remarkable  activity.  A  habit 
of  deep  thought  had  given  a  stoop  to  his 
figure  in  advanced  life  and  he  generally 
walked  with  his  eyes  fastened  upon  the 
ground,  his  coat  buttoned,  and  one  hand 
in  his  pocket,  whilst  the  other  swung 
by  his  side. 

The  education  and  experience  of  Price 
were  such  with  his  inherited  disposition 
as  naturally  to  give  him  a  bent  toward 
his  philosophical  and  political  beliefs. 
The  influence  of  his  times  was  marked. 
The  cynicism  of  Hobbes,  the  satire  of 
Mandeville,  the  skepticism  of  Hume  and 


11 


' 


tlio  hedonism  of  Hutcheson,  had  contri- 
buted cumulatively  to  arouse  Price.  Add- 
ed to  this  was  the  sensationalism  of 
Locke  aided  by  the  sentimenttalism  of 
Butler  and  Smith.  Just  as  Cudworth 
sought  to  refute  Hobbes,  so  Price  was 
led  to  rebuke  Locke  and  Hutcheson. 
Locke's  theory  that  all  ideas  originated 
in  sensations  aroused  many  reflective 
minds  in  England  and  on  the  Continent. 
Hutcheson  tried  to  explain  ideas  of 
right  and  of  the  good  by  agreement  in 
part  with  Locke  yet  providing  a  special 
moral  sense.  Price,  some  French,  and 
some  Scottish  philosophers,  on  the  other 
hand,  denied  Locke's  theory  and  sought 
to  prove  the  existence  of  another  source 
of  knowledge  in  the  intuitive  reason. 

Origin  of  Right   and  Wrong. 

Men  discover  right  in  the  actions  of 
i:heir  fellows.  Price  notes  three  differ- 
ent perceptions  relating  to  these  ac- 
tions: (1)  Perception  of  the  right  and 
wrong;  (2)  Our  perception  of  beauty 
and  deformity.  (These  perceptions  are 
what  he  afterward  means  by  intuition , ) 
(3)  Judgments  of  good  or  ill  desert.  * — 1 
What  power  within  us  perceived 
and  determined  the  idea  of  the  right? 
He  finally  answers  dogmatically  the 
power  of  the  understanding  known  as 
intuition. 

Price  immediately  sets  about  discus- 
sing Dr.  Hutcheson's  views  as  to  a  mo- 
ral sense  and  refuting  them.  He  ap- 
proves the  immediate  action  of  the 
moral  sense,  saying  Hutcheson  "has  in- 
deed well  shown,  that  we  have  a.  facul- 
ty determining  us  immediately  to  ap- 
prove or  disapprove  actions,  abstracted 
from  all  views  of  private  advantage; 
and  that  the  highest  pleasures  of  life 
depend  upon  this  faculty."  * — 2 

Hereupon  Price's  approval  ceases.  He 
puts  1 1 ul rill-son's  meaning  of  the  term 
moral  sense  MS  follows:  "He  considered 
it  as  the  effect  of  a  positive  constitution 
of  our  minds,  or  as  a  relish  given 
them  for  certain  moral  objects  and 
forms  and  aversion  to  others,  similar  to 
the  relishes  and  aversions  given  us  for 
particular  object  >  of  the  external  and 
internal  senses.  If  this  author  is  right, 
our  ideas  of  morality  have  the  same 
original  with  our  ideas  of  the  sensible 


—1  Review  of  Morals.  Judges  P.  17-19. 
*— 2  P.  10 


qualities  of  bodies."  (* — 3)  "Our  percep- 
tion of  right,  of  moral  good,  in  actions  is 
that  agreeable  emotion  or  feeling,  which 
certain  actions  produce  in  us;  and  of 
wrong,  or  moral  evil,  the  contrary." 
Hence  virtue  is  by  this  view  only  a 
matter  of  taste  and  nothing  within  the 
actions,  but  a  sensation  of  the  mind. 

For  Price  then  here  lies  the  funda- 
mental question  as  to  the  foundation  of 
morals.  "For,"  he  says,  "granting  that 
we  have  distinct  perceptions  of  moral 
right  or  wrong  they  must  denote  either 
what  the  actions  are,  to  which  we  apply 
them,  or  only  our  feelings,  and  agreea- 
bly to  this,  the  power  of  perceiving  them 
must  be  either  that  power  whose  ob- 
ject is  truth,  or  some  implanted  power 
or  sense."  It  must  be  recognized  that  ac-  / 
tions  alone  are  too  narrow  a  basis  for 
ethical  theories,  for  there  are  good  mo- 
tives, wills  and  characters. 

Price  makes  quick  disposition  of  other 
theories.  He  says  "the  schemes  which 
found  morality  on  self-love,  on  positive 
laws  or  compacts,  or  on  the  Divine 
Will,  must  mean,  that  moral  good 
and  evil  are  only  other  words  for  ad- 
vantageous and  disadvantageous,  willed 
and  forbidden ;  or  they  relate  not  to  the 
question,  which  is  the  nature  and  true 
account  of  virtue;  but,  what  is  the  suby 
ject-matter  of  it."  The  former  leads 
to  tautology,  the  latter  to  the  investi- 
gations of  reason,  the  faculty  which 
must  find  out  what  is  comformable  to 
will  and  that  judges  of  the  tendencies 
and  effects  of  actions. 

Locke  claimed  all  our  ideas  came  ^ 
from  sensation  and  reflection,  now  re- 
cognized an  error.  But,  this  view  was 
quite  prevalent  in  the  Eighteenth  cen- 
tury when  psychology  was  undeveloped. 
Notwithstanding  that  sensation  does  im- 
mediately give  many  ideas,  yet  it  does 
not  follow  that  sensation  is  the  source 
of  all  simple  or  original  ideas.  In  op- 
position, Price  says,  "The  power,  I  as- 
sert, that  understands;  or  the  faculty 
within  us  that  discerns  truth,  and  thai 
compares  all  objects  and  ideas,  and  judges 
of  them,  is  a  spring  of  new  ideas."  Of 
this  Riedsays:  "Dr.  Price  has  observed 
very  Justly^  that,  if  we  take  the  words 
sensation  and  reflection  as  Mr.  Locke 
has  defined  them  in  the  beginning  of  his 
excellent  essay,  it  will  be  impossible  to 

ill 

*— 3  P.  9. 


12 


derive  some  of  the  most  important  of 
our  ideas  from  them."  * — 1 

Price  refers  to  the  classification  of 
the  faculties  of  the  mind.  He  distin- 
guishes not  only  between  sensation  and 
understanding,  but  the  latter  from  im- 
agination. He  objects  to  putting  all 
faculties  under  understanding  and  will, 
and  yet  neglects  the  latter,  as  well  as 
the  emotions.  The  two  acts  of  under- 
standing for  him(* — 2)  are  intuition  and 
deduction.  Elsewhere  he  speaks  of 
judging  as  under  intuition  but  seems 
to  know  nothing  of  induction.  The 
original  sources  of  our  ideas  as  consid- 
ered at  present  day  are:  (1)  Per- 
ception, giving  sensations  and  precepts; 
(2)  Conception,  giving  concepts  or  gen- 
eral ideas,  which  Price  recognizes  inde- 
finitely (* — 3);  (3)  Abstraction  giving  ab- 
stract ideas.  (4)  Intuition  giving  intuits. 
The  last  three  are  phases  of  the  under- 
standing according  to  Price  but  not  clear- 
ly differentiated  (* — 4)  He  calls  their 
products  simple,  original,  and  uncom- 
ponded  perceptions  of  the  mind  which 
in  many  is  untrue. 

Price  returns  to  discuss  a  moral  sense 
from  time  to  time  and  his  work  has  been 
said  to  be  professedly  directed  against 
the  doctrines  of  Hutcheson  in  particu- 
lar, yet  the  treatment  as  a  whole  is 
constructive  rather  than  polemical.  In 
regard  to  moral  sense,  he  says:  (1) 
What  judges,  as  the  moral  faculty  does, 
concerning  the  perceptions  of  the  senses 
cannot  itself  be  a  sense;  (2)  One  sense 
cannot  judge  another.  "Sense  consists 
in  the  obtruding  of  certain  impressions 
upon  us,  independently  of  our  wills; 
but  it  cannot  perceive  what  they  are, 
or  whence  they  are  derived."  "The  un- 
derstanding takes  cognizance  of  its  ob- 
ject within  itself,  and  by  its  own  native 
power  masters  and  comprehends." 
"Sense  presents  particular  forms  to  the 
mind;  but  cannot  rise  to  any  general 
ideas.  It  is  the  intellect  that  examines 
and  compares  the  presented  forms,  that 
rises  above  individuals,  to  universal  and 
abstract  ideas;  and  thus  looks  down- 
ward upon  objects,  takes  in  at  one  view 
an  infinity  of  particulars,  and  is  capa- 
ble of  discovering  general  truths.  Sense 
!  sees  only  the  outside  of  things,  reason 


—1  Reid's  Works,  Vol.  1,  P.  347. 
*— 2  P.  lg  N. 
*— 3  P.  20.  *— 4  P.  37 


acquaints  itself  with  their  natures."  (* — 5) 
This  seems  to  be  quite  a  good  state- 
ment of  abstraction,  generalization,  and 
induction  for  that  day,  though  the  terms 
are  used  freely  and  not  strictly  in  the 
latter  day  senses. 

"It  is  the  intellect  that  must  perceive 
order  and  proportion  variety  and  regu- 
larity, design,  connection,  art  and  pow- 
er; aptitudes,  dependencies,  correspon- 
dencies, and  adjustment  of  parts,  so  as 
to  subserve  an  end,  and  compose  one  per- 
fect whole."  (*— 6)  Here  he  follows  Cud- 
worth  and  Plato. 

Price  then  traces  the  action  of  the 
understanding  as  an  intuitive  power 
quite  satisfactory  for  his  day  in  devel- 
oping ideas  of  solidity,  inertia,  sub- 
stance, duration,  space,  power  and  cau- 
sation. He  fails  here  to  develop  the  in-  -* 
tuitive  idea  of  truth  as  co-ordinate  with 
the  right  and  so  has  much  resulting  con- 
fusion afterward.  Some  statements  seem 
to  imply  that  truth  is  generic  including 
the  other  intuitions.  Here  later  intui- 
tional writers  seem  to  do  better — the 
true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good  are 
separate  institutions.  Price's  statement 
is  as  follows:  "After  the  mind  has 
been  furnished  with  ideas  of  various 
objects  and  existence,  they  become 
themselves  further  objects  to  the  intel- 
lective faculty;  from  which  arises  a  new 
set  of  ideas,  which  are  perceptions  of 
this  faculty,  and  the  objects  of  which 
are,  not  the  mind's  own  affections,  but 
necessary  truth.  (* — 7)  Here  he  founds 
the  common  sense  philosophy.  "Were  the 
question  whether  our  ideas  of  number, 
causation,  &c.,  represent  the  truth  and 
reality  perceived  by  the  understanding, 
or  particular  impressions  made  by  the 
object; — were  this,  I  say,  the  question; 
would  it  not  be  sufficient  to  appeal  to 
common  sense  and  leave  it  to  be  deter- 
mined by  every  person's  private  con- 
sciousness ?  (* — 8) 

"No  unmixed  act  of  understanding, 
merely  as  such,  and  without  the  agency 
of  some  intermediate  emotion,  can  af- 
fect the  will.  The  account  given  by  v 
Price  of  perceptions  and  judgments  re- 
specting moral  subjects,  does  not  ad- 
vance one  step  towards  the  explanation 

*— 5  P.  20  *— 6  P.  21 

*— 7  PP.  53-54 

* — 8  Jas.  Mackintosh,  Miscellaneous 
Works.   P.   146 


13 


>ver  the 


J       of  the  authority  of  conscience  ov( 

Will,  which  is  the  matter  to  be  explain- 
ed." Price,  however,  felt  the  difliculty, 
so  much  as  to  allow,  "that  in  contem- 
plating th<>  acts  of  moral  agents,  we 
have  both  a  perception  of  the  under- 
standing and  a  feeling  of  the  heart."  He 
even  admits  that  it  would  have  been 
highly  prenicious  to  us,  if  our  reason 
has  been  left  without  such  support.  But, 
he  has  not  shown  how  on  such  a  suppo- 
sition, we  could  have  acted  on  a  mere 
opinion,  nor  has  he  given  any  proof 
that  what  he  calls  "support"  is  not,  in 
truth,  the  whole  of  what  produces  the 
conformity  of  voluntary  acts  to  morali- 
ty. The  following  sentence  from  Price 
illustrates  his  and  all  theories  on  mere 
•V  intellectual  principles:  "Reason  alone 
did  we  possess  it  in  a  higher  degree, 
would  answer  all  the  ends  of  the  pas- 
sions. Thus  there  were  no  need  of  pa- 
rental affection,  were  all  parents  suffi- 
ciently acquainted  with  the  reasons  for 
taking  upon  them  the  guidance  and  sup- 
port of  those  whom  nature  has  placed 
under  their  care,  and  were  they  virtu- 
ous enough  to  be  always  determined  by 
those  reasons."  (*-l)  A  very  slight  consid- 
eration shows  that,  without  these  last 
words,  the  preceding  part  would  be  ut- 
terly false,  and  with  them  it  is  utterly 
insignificant. 

Summary  of  "Good  and  111  Desert." 

Ideas  of  good  or  ill  desert  necessarily 
arise  in  us  upon  considering  certain  ac- 
tions and  characters.  Virtue  is  worthy 
and  vice  is  unworthy.  These  ideas  are 
a  species  of  'the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong 
^  with  the  following  difference:  Right 
and  wrong  are,  with  strict  propriety, 
applied  to  actions  but  good  and  ill  de- 
sert belong  rather  to  the  agents.  The 
agent  alone  is  capable  of  happiness  or 
misery;  and  he  alone  properly  can  be 
said  to  deserve  these.  There  is  a  pro- 
priety in  making  those  happy  who  prac- 
tice virtue  and  in  discountenancing  the 
vicious  and  corrupt.  "When  we  say,  a 
man  deserves  well,  we  mean  that  his 
character  is  such  that  we  approve  of 
showing  him  favor;  or  that  it  is  right 
he  ^lonld  be  happier  than  if  he  had 
been  of  a  different  character.  We  can- 
not 1ml  love  the  virtuous  agent,  and  de- 
sire his  happiness  above  that  of  others. 


*—  1  Review  P.  121 


"Reason    determines    at    once,    that      he    ^ 
ought  to  be  the  better   for  his  virtue." 
The  opposite  is  true  of  a  vicious  being. 

Different  characters  require  different 
treatment,  but  not  merely  on  account  of 
their  relative  happiness,  or  other  con- 
sequences. Such  discrimination  in 
treatment  is  immediately  and  ultimate- 
ly right.  Vice  is  of  essential  demerit 
and  virtue  is  in  itself  rewardable.  These 
are  instances  of  absolute  and  eternal 
rectitude,  and  are  by  no  means,  wholly 
coincident  with  or  resolvable  into  views 
of  public  utility  and  inutility. 

Price  founds  a  system  of  rewards  and 
punishments   here   especially  with    refer- 
ence  to   Divine   government.      The    good 
are  to  hope  for  eternal  reward  and  the 
wicked   for  everlasting   punishment.   God 
has  given  us  natures  in  accordance  with 
His  own.     Since  our  perception  of  good 
desert  is   a  necessary   perception   of  our 
reason,  it  demonstrates   to  us   what  the 
supreme  reason  will   do,  what  laws  and 
rules  it  observes  in  carrying  on  the  hap- 
piness of  the  universe.     It  is  the  inten-L 
tion   that    gives    virtue    objective    merit.  J 
When   the    motive    is    good    there    is    soj^ 
far  virtue,  whatever  the  issue  in  action. 
The   highest   motive    is   to   do    right   be-' 
cause  it  is  right. 

This  summary  deserves  observations.  \ 
How  (tan  the  right  be  a  simple  idea  if  ' 
all  this~is  true?  If  good  and  ill  desert 
"are  plainly  a  species  of  the  ideas  of 
right  and  wrong;  (* — 2)  then  it  is  per- 
ferable  to  call  the  ethical  idea  complex. 
The  intuition  of  the  good  embraces 
three  conceptions — the  right  and 
wrong,  the  obligation  to  do  the  right 
and  not  to  do  the  wrong,  and  the  merit 
or  demerit  of  the  doer  of  the  actions. 
In  this  respect,  the  idea  of  the  right 
differs  from  that  of  beauty,  space,  time 
or  any  other  of  the  rational  ideas.  The 
definition  of  Bowne  has  been  admired: 
"Merit  is  the  desert  of  moral  approval 
and  the  right  to  be  treated  accordingly; 
while  demerit  is  the  desert  of  moral 
disapproval  and  its  appropriate  treat- 
ment.'^*— 3)  Ladd  suggests  that  "this 
definition  must  be  interpreted  as  in- 
volving three  factors:  (1)  .A  feeling  ofu 
obligation  to  approve  (I  ought  to  be 
morally  approbated)  ;  (2)  A  feeling 
of  right  to  assert  a  claim  (I  am  enti- 

*— 2  Review  Morals,  P.  128 
*— 3  Principles  of  Ethics  P.  171 


14 


tied  to  some  form  of  the  good,  which 
ought  to  come  to  me)  ;  (3)  A  vague 
feeling  of  another's  duty  as  it  were  (for 
another  than  I  ought  to  treat  me  "ac- 
cordingly"— oy  bringing  me  some  re- 
ward). 

All  this  suggests  that  the  complexity 
of  the  conception  of  merit  is  one  of 
much  difficulty  and  beyond  the  analy- 
tic power  of  the  days  of  Price.  Butler 
had  said:  "Our  sense  of  discernment  of 
actions  as  morally  good  or  evil  implies 
in  it  a  sense  or  discernment  of  them  as 
of  good  or  ill  desert."  (*— 1)  On  the 
opposite  view  the  tendency  of  both 
Calvanistic  theologians  and  many  ra- 
tionalistic  moralists  is  to  refuse  to  ad- 
niit  that  merit  can  belong  to  human 
actions.  A  man  can  never  do  more  than 
bis  duty.  Such  was  the  position  of  the 
IStoics  and  Kant.  In  later  times  "mer- 
it"' has  not  always  been  distinguished 
from  "worth"  and  the  tendency  has 
been  to  build  up  a  system  of  values  in 
ethics,  with  many  new  problems.  Mei- 
nong  and  Ehrent'elds  have  been  leaders 
here; 'the  latter  claiming  that  the  pro- 
cess of  valuation  is  identical  with  de- 
sire, and  the  former  that  the  sense  of 
value  given  in  feelings  of  worth  follow 
upon  processes  of  the  judgment.  Ever 
since  the  days  of  Protagoras  relative 
values  have  been  recognized.  The  ques- 
tion, "What  is  life  worth?"  is  ultimate, 
leading  to  the  alternative  of  Optimism 
or  Pessimism. 

The  Origin  of  Our  Desires  and  Affections. 
The  development  of  human  feelings 
seems  somewhat  crude  and  indefinite  in 
the  mind  of  Price,  though  he  has  some 
original  and  valuable  ideas.  One  would 
generally  rather  call  benevolence  a  viij- 
tue  than  an  affection.  He  seems  to"~ap- 
prehend  an  affection  clearly  so  far  as 
its  object  is  "desired  for  its  own  sake." 
We  understand  affections  to  be  benevo- 
lent or  malevolent.  Under  the  former 
are  included  such  forms  as  love  of  kin- 
dred, love  of  friends,  gratitude,  patriot- 
ism, philanthropy,  and  piety.  Price 
makes  a  mistake  when  he  puts  ambition 
here  rather  than  among  the  egotistic 
emotions.  Probably  a  very  close  classi- 
fication of  feelings  ought  not  to  be  ex- 
pected in  the  time  of  Price,  particularly 
when  the  sensibilities  are  so  inadequate- 

* — 1  Dissertation  on  Virtue. 


ly  treated  by  psychologists  even  at  the 
.present  time. 

Price   says,   "The   desire   of   happiness.  ._ 

for  ourselves  certainly  arises  not  from^  v- 
instinct."  (*-2)  Here  we  must  differ  from 
him,  for  we  find  that  the  later 
intuitionists  state  just  oppositely:  "The 
desire  of  happiness  is  instinctive  and 
universal."  (*  —  3)  It  is  not  entirely  sel- 
fish, since  it  may  be  accompanied  with 
a  generous  desire  for  the  happiness  of 
others.  Nor  is  this  desire  the  only 
instinctive  one,  at  least  in  its  begin- 
nings, for  such  also  are  desire  of  socie- 
ty, desire  of  power,  desire  of  esteem, 
and  desire  of  knowledge.  Price  himself 
says:  "All  the  inferior  orders  of  crea- 
tures, and  men  themselves  during  their 
first  years  have  no  other  guide  than 
instinct."  (*-4)  Doubtless  he  is  right  in 
what  follows:  "The  further  men  ad- 
vance in  existence,  and  the  wiser  they 
grow,  the  more  they  are  disengaged 
from  it."  (*-5). 

We  cannot  but  think  Price  in  the 
wrong  in  this  chapter  in  that  he  places 
all  affection  toward  others  under  the 
term  benevolence.  It  would  seem  that 
the  quotation  in  Chapter  VII  from  But- 
ler's Analogy  as  well  as  Price's  own 
remarks  there  fully  justify  this  criti- 
cism. Benevolence  is  neither  the  whole 


of  virtue  nor  is  it  the  whole  of  virtue 
toward  society.  Philosophy,  art  and  re- 
ligion have  taught  man  that  there  is 
more  in  benevolence  than  mere  feeling 
on  the  one  side,  while  there  is  more  in 
such  virtues  as  justice,  and  trueness 
than  can  be  subsumed  under  the  term 
benevolence.  As  Ladd  has  wisely  said, 
"The  idea  of  rational  measure  is  re- 
^quired  as  an  added  ethical  qualification 
in  connection  with  benevolence  itself." 
(*-6)  Much  more  is  this  true  among 
mere  feelings  than  the  more  developed 
virtues.  There  is  no  unity  among  the 
virtues  even,  excepting  as  it  is  organiz- 
ed within  each  individual  self-hood. 

And  yet  some  of  the   feelings  have  a,J 
rational   basis   as  Price  claims.     Among 
the   rational   emotions    have  been   justly 
placed    the    egoistic,    the    aesthetic,    and^i 
the    ethical.      We    would    include    under 


> 


—2  Review  Morals  P.   112. 
*— 3  Brooks,  Mental  Science  P.  452 
* — 4  Review  Morals  P.  125.     Also  * — 5. 
*6 — Ladd,  Philosophy  of  Conduct  P.  359. 


the  egoistic  such  as  pride  and  humility; 
under  the  aesthetic,  novelty,  beauty,  the 
sublime  and  the  ludicrous;  under  the 
ethical,  feelings  of  obligation,  satisfac- 
\  tion,  and  remorse.  All  of  these  are 
awakened  by  a  rational  cognition.  They 
arise  from  ideas  of  intuition,  or  the 
reason. 

Price's  distinction  between  affection 
and  passion  seems  somewhat  inadequate. 
He  says  that  when  affections  are  "aided 
and  strengthened  by  instinctive  deter- 
minations," they  are  called  passions. 
More  generally  animal  desires  are  called 
passions,  but  all  desires  and  emotions 
become  passions  when  they  are  "strong 
and  uncontrolled  dispositions;  so  strong 
as  to  exclude  or  overpower  other  mental 
tendencies,  and  to  give  rise  on  occasion 
to  uncontrolled  emotions."  (* — 1) 

Chapter  seven  in  Price's  Review  of 
Morals  treats  of  "The  Subject-matter  of 
Virtue,  or  its  Principal  Heads  and  Di- 
visions." This  is  a  crude  attempt  to 
classify  the  virtues.  He  follows  the 
well-established  custom  of  putting  all 
under  Duties  to  God,  to  our  fellow  men 
and  to  ourselves.  Here  he  shows  the 
futility  of  endeavoring  to  put  all  virtue 
under  benevolence  or  the  study  of  the 
public  good,  still  maintaining  that  term 
in  too  wide  a  significance,  however.  Un- 
der duty  to  God,  we  do  not  find  him 
discussing  systematically,  such  specific 
duties  as  reverence,  obedience,  worship — 
including  prayer,  praise,  and  the  keep- 
ing of  the  Sabbath — though  he  refers  to 
devotion,  piety,  blasphemy,  and  love  to 
God. 

Under  duty  to  our  fellow-men,  we  do 
not  find  him  discussing  liberty,  reputa- 
tion, the  family,  nor  the  state,  though 
he  touches  upon  beneficence  as  all-inclu- 
sive. In  this  particular  he  discusses 
gratitude,  veracity,  the  sacredness  of 
promises,  and  justice,  which  has  an  eco- 
nomic significance,  relating  particularly 
to  property. 

Under  duties  to  self,  he  first  endea- 
vors to  show  that  these  have  as  real  an 
existence  as  others  and  are  equally  as 
binding,  but  he  does  not  go  into  the  dis- 
cussion of  self-support,  self-defence,  self- 
control,  nor  self -culture,  excepting  that 
in  regard  to  the  latter,  he  says  we 
should  act  "up  to  the  dignity  and  hopes 
of  immortal  beings,  and  the  uniform  and 


*— 1  Dictionary  of  Philosophy,  Baldwin 


steadfast  pursuit  of  our  own  true  per- 
fection  in  opposition  to  whatever  diffi- 
culties may  come  our  way.  This  is 
high  and  true  virtue."  (* — 2) 

However,  in  this  chapter,  he  makes 
some  sensible  remarks  upon  question  of 
casiustry.  He  also  opens  the  door  to 
the  differences  of  opinion  which  have 
arisen  among  inTuTtionists,  whether  the 
Tightness  or  wrongness  is  evident  with 
reference  to  classes  or  kinds  of  actions 
or  motives — giving  general  principles  or 
rules — or  whether  only  the  moral  char- 
acter of  particular  actions  is  intuitively 
perceived.  Price  says,  "However  differ- 
ent from  one  another  the  heads  which 
have  been  enumerated  are,  yet,  from 
the  very  notion  of  them,  as  heads  of 
virtue,  it  is  plain,  that  they  all  run 
up  to  onejgeneral  idea,  and  should  be 
considered  "as  only  different  modifications 
and  views  of  one  original,  all-governing 
law.  It  is  the  same  authority  that  en- 
joins, the  same  truth  and  right  that 
oblige,  the  same  eternal  reason  that 
commands  in  them  all.  Virtue  thus 
considered,  is  necessarily  one  thing  * 
*  True  and  genuine  virtue 
must  be  uniform  and  universal."  (* — 3) 

While  this  chapter  makes  no  claim 
to  be  an  exposition  of  practical  morali- 
ty in  detail,  yet  he  discusses  the  "dem- 
onstration of  morality,"  or  its  applica- 
tion to  particular  cases  in  an  illuminat- 
ing manner.  Many  moral  principles  or 
maxims  are  self-evident,  yet  the  putting 
of  many  special  cases  under  general  prin- 
ciples is  not  so  plain.  Here  he  disposes 
of  the  "particular  intuitionis'ts"  sum- 
marily, and  takes  the  ground,  "Before 
we  can  be  capable  of  deducing  demon- 
strably,  accurately,  and  particularly,  the 
whole  rule  of  right  in  every  instance,  we 
must  possess  universal  and  unerring 
knowledge.  It  must  be  above  the  power 
of  any  finite  understanding  to  do  this."] 
(*— 4) 

Here  also  he  disposes  of  the  theories 
that  education  and  habit  can  be  the 
foundation  of  morals;  for  they  give  us 
no  new  ideas. 

At  the  end  of  the  chapter,  he  dis- 
cusses one  of  the  famous  objections  to 
intuitions,  viz.,  "the  diversity  of  men's 
sentiments  concerning  moral  matters." 

*— 2  Review  Morals  PP.  249-250 
*— 3  Review  Morals  PP.  274-275 
*— 4  Ibid  PP.  282-283 


1U 


what  is  good  is  not  beautiful  ?  Virtue 
in  the  same  respect  which  we  call  it 
good  is  ever  acknowledged  to  be  beau- 
tiful also."  Armstrong  says,  "Virtue 
is  the  strength  and  beauty  of  the  soul." 
And  Prior,  "When  with  beauty  we  can 
virtue  join,  we  paint  the  semblance  of 
a  form  divine." 

The  Relation  of  Morals  to  Natural 
Religion  is  interestingly  and  instructive- 
ly treated  by  Price.  Some  of  his  conclu- 
sions are  more  charmingly  than  con- 
vincingly stated,  however,  yet  they  have 
on  the  whole  a  very  suggestive  outcome. 
When  he  goes  from  human  reason  to 
divine  reason  as  the  origin  of  the  for- 
mer, arguing  that  the  nature  of  things 
is  but  a  reflex  of  the  Divine  nature, 
he  argues  thinkingly  and  pleasingly. 
When  he  discusses  the  motives  of  God, 
however,  according  to  our  human  stand- 
ard, we  have  to  halt.  He  says,  "Upon 
the  principles  defended  in  this  treatise, 
nothing  can  be  more  easy  to  be  ascer- 
tained than  the  moral  perfections  of  the 
Deity."  (* — 1)  Now,  reasoning  by  analo- 
gy has  peculiar  dangers.  Again,  "As  it 
is  evident  that  the  seat  of  infinite  powei\ 
must  be  the  seat  of  infinite  knowledge, 
so  it  appears  from  hence  no  less  evident, 
that  it  must  also  be  the  seat  of  abso- 
lute rectitude;  and  these  qualities,  thus 
implying  one  another  and  essentially 
one,  complete  the  idea  of  the  Deity,  and 
exhibit  Him  to  us  in  a  most  awful  and 
glorious  light."  We  are  inclined  to 
believe  all  this  is  true,  but  we  would 
submit  the  query.  Is  it  so  evident  as 
Price  affirms? 

Our  author  then  goes  on  to  delineate 
the  Divine  administration  of  the  whole 
world  in  his  moral  government  and  to 
discuss  the  state  of  future  rewards  and 
punishment,  raising  a  variety  of  per- 
plexing questions  which  it  does  not  per- 
tain to  us  to  discuss.  These  questions 
in  this  connection  are  suggestive.  Did 
Price  recognize  the  insufficiency  of  mo- 
rals without  the  support  of  religion? 
Did  he  recognize  that  just  as  the  unity 
of  virtue  is  attained  only  in  some  spir- 
itual, ethical  being,  so  it  is  only  by 
the  unification  of  truth,  beauty  and 
goodness  in  the  world  ground — an  ethi- 
cal, personal  spirit — that  the  mind  finds 
satisfaction?  We  are  inclined  to  think 
that  he  did  not  see  this  from  the  philo- 

*— 1  Review  Morals  P.  407 


sophical  side  but  from  the  theological 
point  of  view;  and,  is  not  the  philoso- 
pher driven  to  practically  the  position 
of  the  theologians,  only  stated  differ- 
ently ? 

Conclusion. 

1.  Criticisms. — It  is  really  a  task  to 
say  aught  by  way  of  difference  of  opin- 
ion  with  so  amiable  a  philosopher ;  so 
earnest  and  successful  a  minister;  so 
thorough-going  and  widely-read  a  stu- 
dent; and  so  natural,  kindly  and  unaf- 
fected a  man  as  Richard  Price.  Marti- 
neau  says  somewhere  that  Price  had 
just  the  right  personality  to  be  an  in- 
tuitionist,  and  we  think  a  perusal  of 
his  life  has  entirely  satisfied  us  that 
this  is  true.  Fichte  has  also  said: 
"The  kind  of  philosophy  which  one 
chooses  depends  upon  the  kind  of  man 
one  is.  For  a  philosophical  system  is 
not  a  dead  bit  of  furniture  which  one 
can  take  to  one's  self  or  dispose  of,  as 
one  pleases ;  but  it  is  endowed  with  a 
soul  by  the  soul  of  the  man  who  has 
it."  Perchance  his  kindliness  is  some- 
times all  too  destructive  of  severity  in 
his  logic,  at  any  rate  the  popularity  he 
had  both  as  a  minister  and  a  philoso- 
pher waned  as  time  went  on.  He  seems.  /" 
to  have  exceeded  others  of  his  day  as  aljr 
compiler  and  classifier  but  added  little 
which  was  original  or  profound.  He 
was  aesthetic,  delicate  in  sentiment,  but 
not  always  clear  nor  exhaustive.  Ne- 
cessarily it  would  be  tiresome  and  sa- 
vor of  quibbling  to  catalogue  the  lesser 
faults. 

The  great  defect  of  this  school  of 
ethics  is  due  to  the  unanalyzed  condi- 
tion in  which  they  have  left  the  volun- 
tary element  in  action.  Intellect  and 
sensibility  are  analyzed  and  discrimi- 
nated but  not  will.  They  contemplate 
the  voluntary  element  as  an  integral 
fact,  in  which  as  a  single  thing,  a  cer- 
tain quality  of  right  or  wrong  is  per- 
ceived. As  there  is  not  always  agree- 
ment in  assigning  the  epithets  used, 
and  the  applications  of  them  admit  of 
being  justified  by  argument,  their  allot- 
ment was  naturally  attributed  to  rea- 
son. So  long  as  the  quality  of  right- 
ness  was  left  somewhat  indeterminate 
this  account  seemed  to  pass  without 
challenge.  But  as  soon  as  the  Tightness 
was  insisted  upon  as  an  absolutely  sim- 
ple quality,  intuitively  apprehended  by 


Reason,  it  became  impossible  to  under- 
stand how  its  presence  in  a  given  act 
could  be  affirmed  by  one  person  and 
denied  by  another;  and  how,  without 
any  complex  contents  admitting  of  com- 
parison, it  could  ever  be  reasoned  out 
between  two  opponents.  The  rational 
faculty  has  got  the  credit  of  it  on  pre- 
cisely the  ground  that  it  was  now  taken 
from  it,  viz.,  that  it  could  be  the  sub- 
ject of  argument  among  persons  seek- 
ing the  truth  about  it  but  not  yet 
agreed;  that  was  exactly  the  process 
of  which  the  intuitive  reason  did  not 
admit.  The  difficulty  which  thus 
arises,  of  reconciling  discrepancies  of 
ethical  judgment  with  intuitive  cer- 
tainty, no  writer  of  the  school  has  been 
able  to  overcome.  It  can  never  vanish 
until  separate  attention  is  fixed  upon 
the  springs  of  action  in  the  mind  and 
the  operation  of  actions  when  put  forth ; 
of  the  former  the  relative  quality  is 
known  by  intuitions ;  of  the  latter  by 
calculation.  The  total  character  of  the 
action  is  composed  of  both,  its  recti- 
tude depending  upon  the  first,  its  wis- 
dom upon  the  second;  in  the  one  aspect 
it  is  amenable  to  conscience;  in  the  oth- 
er, to  reason;  neither  of  which  can  per- 
form the  function  of  the  other.  (* — 1) 

Intuitionism. 

This  theory  contradicts  the  law  of 
parsimony  and  being  unnecessary  is 
therefore  unphilosophical.  By  many, 
intuitional  theory  is  held  to  contradict 
consciousness.  The  right  is  not  gen- 
erally assumed  as  the  category  of  re- 
\  ality.  As  we  have  seen,  ethical  emo- 
*  tions  are  not  to  be  accounted  for.  By 
many,  it  is  held  that  so  called  intui- 
tional judgments  are  only  those  rapidly 
formed  as  results  of  instincts,  heredity 
and  education.  Much  criticism  of  intu- 
itional theory  has  pertained  to  the  good 
"as  a  simple  idea." 

Jouffroy  insists  at  grenth  length  that 
moral  good  is  necessarily  a  choice  of 
natural  good;  and  that  consequently 
moral  good  cannot  be  simple,  but  must 
be  a  complex  idea  and  consequently  de- 
finable. (* — 2)  Action  cannot  be  judged 
excepting  in  relation  to  its  end;  this 

* — 1  Summarized  Argument  from  Mar- 
tineau — Types  of  Ethical  Theory, 
P.  484. 

*— 2  Introduction  to  Ethics—  Vol.  II,  P. 
327. 


end  must  be  perceived  before  it  is 
judged,  and  only  from  the  nature  of  the 
end  can  the  nature  of  the  action  be  de- 
termined. An  act  will  be  good,  if  it 
has  a  worthy  end.  Besides  a  goodness 
of  actions  there  is  a  goodness  of  ends. 
In  determining  that  there  are  good  ends, 
a  definition  of  good-in-itself  is  deter- 
mined. Moral  quality  is  therefore  de- 
fined as  conformability  of  actions,  mo- 
tives and  attitudes  to  ultimate  ends. 

The  intuitional  theory  is  impracti- 
cable in  practice  because  it  leads  to  in- 
consistency. Truth,  justice,  temperence 
and  courtesy  are  respectively  right  but 
the  Tightness  common  cannot  be  ex- 
plained. All  is  arbitrary,  for  right  is 
right.  In  cases  of  conflict,  no  reason 
for  "^preference  of  one  virtue  over  an- 
other can  be  assigned.  Again,  all  men 
are  equally  capable  of  appreciating  the 
morality  of  actions,  and  consequently 
equally  enlightened  in  moral  judgment. 
There  can  be  no  difference  between  the 
learned  and  Lhe  ignorant,  none  between 
men  of  different  ages,  moral  science, 
cannot  be  developed,  therefore  with  the 
progress  of  civilization  and  savages 
must  be  equally  well  informed  with  the 
civilized.  Morality  of  one  action  cannot 
be  deduced  from  another;  ethics  cannot 
be  reduced  to  a  system  nor  taught;  and 
finally  there  can  really  be  no  ethical 
science  other  than  a  mere  catalogue  of 
right  actions  recognized  by  intuition. 

Conflict  is  also  aroused  between  duty 
and  well-being.  Desire  for  happiness  is 
a  good  impulse  in  its  sphere  and  is  a 
root  of  worthy  individual  and  social 
virtues.  To  fail  to  recognize  it  is  un- 
philosophical, to  flout  it  tempts  to  af- 
fectation in  theory  and  hyjocrisy  in 
practice.  Ethical  theory  should  adjust 
strife  between  motives. 

criticises    Cudworth, 


, 


Butler  and  Price  because  they  maintain 
that  virtue  carries  its  own  obligation 
in  itself;  "that  the  understanding  at 
once  perceives  a  certain  action  to  be 
right  and  therefore  it  ought  to  be  per- 
formed." Objections  to  this  are:(*-3)  (IjJ 
It  supposes  the  understandings  of  men 
to  determine  whether  precisely  in  the 
same  manner  concerning  all  virtuous  and 
vicious  actions,  which  is  contrary  to 
fact. 


'—3  P.  68,  R.  Watson's  "Theological  In- 
stitutes." 


20 


(2)  *  It  supposes  a  previous   rule,  by 
which    the    action    is    determined    to    be 
right;   but  if  the   revealed  Will  of  God 
is    not    to    be    taken    into   consideration, 
what   common    rule   exists    among   men  ? 
There    is    evidently    no    such    rule,    and 
therefore    no   means    of    certainly    deter- 
mining what  is  right. 

( 3 )  )  If    a    common      standard      were 
known    among   men,    and    if   the   under- 
standings   of    men    determined    in    the 
same   manner    as   to    the   conformity    or 
otherwise,    of   an    action    to   that   stand- 
ard;  what  renders   it  a  matter   of  obli- 
gation that  any  one  should  perform   it? 
The    rule   must    be    proved    to   be    bind- 
ing,   or   no   ground   of   obligation    is    es- 
tablished. 

Of  course  the  evolutionist  would  cri- 
ticise the  intuitional  school  from  a  dif- 
ferent point  of  view,  somewhat  as  fol- 
lows: Whatever  certain  personal  cha- 
racteristics become  fixed,  it  is  well 
known  that  they  frequently  pass  from 
parent  to  child;  so  that  much  of  the 
character  which  has  been  won  by  self- 
discipline  is  transmitted  by  inheritance, 
and  the  son  starts  from  a  station  in  ad- 
vance of  his  father.  Hence,  as  Spencer 
says,  "From  this  cause,  it  is  suggested, 
the  inward  experience  of  past  genera- 
tions may  establish  a  cerebral  register 
of  themselves,  ever  deepening  in  its 
trace  and  quickening  in  its  velocity  of 
movement;  and  this  swift  compound  of 
what  were  once  long  processes  of 
thought  or  feeling  turns  up  in  us  as  In- 
tuition and,  assuming  the  airs  of  a 
heaven-sent  conscience,  tempts  us  to 
overlook  and  despise  the  homely  utili- 
ties which  alone  it  represents."  This  is 
Mr.  Spencer's  celebrated  doctrine  that 
"Experience  of  utility,  organized  and 
consolidated  during  all  past  generations 
of  the  human  race,  has  been  producing 
nervous  modifications,  which,  by  con- 
tinued transmission  and  accumulation 
become  in  us  certain  faculties  of  moral 
intuition,  certain  emotions  responding 
to  right  and  wrong  conduct,  which  have 
no  apparent  basis  in  the  individual  ex- 
perience of  utility." — (*1). 

II.  Appreciation.  Dr.  Price's  work 
has  been  very  highly  approved.  Marti- 


* — 1  From  Spencer's  letter  to  Mill  and 
appreciation  in  Bain's  Mental  and 
Moral  Science,  P.  721. 


neau  characterizes  his  morals  as  the 
"completest  expository  work"  of  his 
school.  "It  is  not  a  fragment  like  Cud- 
worth's  treatise;  it  is  not  a  subsidiary 
chapter  of  Natural  Theology,  like 
Clarke's;  it  .presents  an  integral  the- 
ory, standing  on  its  own  independent 
territory  and  carefully  guarded  from 
threatening  border  warfare  all  around." 
(*-2) 

"Price  cannot,  after  such  predeces- 
sors, materially  strengthen  the  founda- 
tions of  the  theory;  and  when  we  pro- 
ceed to  test  them  we  find  ourselves  mea- 
suring a  familiar  corner  stone,  only  be- 
ginning from  a  different  angle.  His 
chief  originality  and  freshness  are 
brought  out  by  the  fact  that  he  is  writ- 
ing for  a  new  generation,  in  which  the 
writings  of  Shaftesbury  and  of  Hutche- 
son  had  touched  some  springs  of  disin- 
terested feeling,  and  awakened  some  con- 
ceptions of  beauty  in  character,  of  which 
the  schools  had  taken  little  or  no  ac- 
count." (*— 3) 

"Price  advanced  no  positive  doctrine 
and  no  body  of  argument  which  is  not 
already  found  in  Cudworth  or  Clarke." 
"It  is  more  easy  to  share  Price's  confi- 
dence in  his  conclusion  than  to  accept 
it  on  the  security  of  his  reasoning."  (* — 4) 

J.  D.  Morrell  says,  "Almost  the  only 
writer  of  the  rationalistic  school  whose 
works  are  likely  to  form  a  part  of  our 
standard  philosophy,  is  Price.  So  ex- 
tensive did  he  make  the  peculiar  prov- 
ince of  reason  in  the  whole  economy 
cf  man,  that  he  considered  it  possible, 
not  only  for  all  our  moral  feelings,  but 
for  all  our  emotions  of  every  kind  to  be 
traced  to  this  source.  In  his  contro- 
versy with  Priestley  particularly,  he 
showed  how  strongly  he  viewed  the  phi- 
losophical aberration  of  the  age,  and 
how  earnestly  he  desired  to  place  moral 
and  metaphysical  truth  upon  its  deeper 
and  truer  foundation."  (* — 5) 

Jouffroy  preferred  "The  moral  sys- 
tem of  Price  over  that  of  the  Scottish 
School  on  acount  of  its  intrinsic  excel- 
lence and  because  in  extent  and  clear- 
ness of  style  it  is  superior  to  either 

*— 2    Types   of    Ethical    Theory   P.   475, 

Jas.    Martineau,    et    seq. 
*— 3  Ibid— Condensed 
* — 4  Ibid — Martineau 
* — 5  Morrell — Modern     Philosophy,  PP. 

143-144 


21 


Reid  or  Stewart."  (*— 1)  "Price  proceeds 
like  a  master.  With  clear  and  penetrat- 
ing view,  he  grasps  at  once  the  essen- 
tial difficulty,  and  conies  directly  to  the 
question."  ( * — 2 )  Price's  "demonstration  is 
as  complete  as  it  is  simple."  (* — 3)  As  to 
Price's  proof  of  the  rational  origin  of 
moral  ideas,  Jouffroy  continues,  "This 
demonstration  is  not  only  beautiful,  it 
is  invulnerable." 

III.  Present  Status  and  Outlook.  Per- 
haps through  neglect,  but  nevertheless 
the  influence  of  Price  has  certainly  di- 
minished and  his  abilities  have  not  se- 
cured for  him  the  prominent  place  hoped 
for  by  many  of  his  friends  and  fellow- 
intuitionists.  The  theories  he  advanced 
have  been  further  developed  and  much 
beyond  his  hopes,  though  in  somewhat 
different  direction.  Much  similarity  ex- 
ists between  the  work  of  Kant  and 
Price  and  yet  no  connection  can  be  es- 
tablished directly,  no  positive  evidence 
being  at  hand  that  Kant  read  Price. 

Fowler  says.  "Price's  views  are  main- 
ly interesting 'in  the  History  of  Morals, 
on  account  of  their  resemblance  to  the 
subsequent  theories  of  Kant."  Among 
these  points  are  the  exaltation  of  rea- 
son ;  the  depreciation  of  the  affections ; 
unwillingness  to  regard  the  partial  and 
accidental  constitution  of  man  as  the 
basis  of  mioraiity;  the  ultimate  and 
irresolvable  character  of  the  idea  of  rec- 
titude; the  notion  that  the  reason  im- 
poses this  idea  as  a  law  upon  the  will, 
becoming  thus  an  independent  spring  of 
action;  the  insistence  upon  the  reality 
of  liberty  or  'the  power  of  acting  or  de- 
termining;' the  importance  attached  to 
the  reason  as  a  distinct  source  of  ideas; 
and  the  discrimination  of  the  moral  from 
the  speculative  understanding."  (* — 4). 
Comparing  the  sketch  of  intuition  and 
idealism  which  we  have  previously  given 
with  the  work  of  Price,  great  advance- 
ment in  definitions  and  clearness  as  well 
as  systematizing  of  ideas,  is  evident. 
All  this  has  been  further  advanced  by 
such  writers  as  Martineau  and  Green. 
In  the  conflict  between  intuitionism  and 
hedonism  both  have  been  modified.  Facts 
have  been  observed  in  the  ethical  expe- 

*— 1   P.  252;    *— 2  P.  255;    *— 3  P.  256, 
Jouffroy's      Introduction    to    Ethics, 
Vol.  II. 
— 4  Principles  of  Morals  by  Fowler  and 


rience  which  contradict  intuitionism : 
(1)  The  common  ideal  is  only  a  "rough 
and  ready  affair."  (2)  A  process  of 
change  is  going  on  in  the  social  ideal. 
The  answer  is  "The  right  is  by  nature 
both  subjective  and  individual  on  the 
one  hand;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
objective  and  universal."  (* — 5) 

Ironically  intuitionism  had  to  meet 
the  results  of  its  own  arguments  against 
Hobbes  as  to  disinterested  impulses  in 
man.  Utility  asserted  that  such  im- 
pulses are  sufficient  test  of  the  morality 
of  actions  and  no  intuitive  faculty  is 
needed.  This  discussion  was  intensified 
by  the  baldness  with  which  Price  held  ; 
that  Tightness  and  wrongness  are  un-  ^ 
analyzable  qualities  of  acts  themselves. 
On  one  side  this  seemed  to  reduce  moral 
science  to  mere  dogmatism,  and  on  the 
other,  it  came  into  conflict  with  the  ruling 
psychological  theory  which  was  analyz- 
ing aii  ideas  into  complexes  of  sense 
qualities,  and  associated  experiences.  So 
intuitionalism  assumed  the  form  which 
it  still  retains — the  assertion  that  moral 
distinctions  flow  from,  and  are  reached 
by  an  inspection  of  acts  themselves,  and 
not  from  a  consideration  of  results. 
Price  did  well  in  systematizing  and 
clearly  stating  this  theory,  as  well  as 
arousing  discussion,  though  he  has  been 
strikingly  surpassed  by  the  greatness 
and  profoundly  of  Kant,  as  well  as  the 
brilliancy  of  Martineau. 

Former  intuitionism  largely  neglected 
social  ethics.  It  realized  personality, 
but  neglected  its  environment  of  other 
personalities,  and  the  consequent  devel- 
opment contijoUed  by  them.  In  jthje 
past,  ethics  has  felt  too  self-sufficient. 
Ethics  has  now  returned  to  the  truth 
which  Plato  saw  but  did  not  clearly 
state:  "No  simple  category  will  ade- 
quately express  the  nature  of  our  high- 
est ideals  of  the  good."  (*— 6)  Utility  of 
truth  will  clear  up  the  ideals.  "The 
moral  nature  of  man  must  blend  its 
voice  in  harmony  with  his  artistic  and 
religious  nature.  Ethics  must  clasp 
hands  with  Aesthetics  and  with  the  Phi- 
losophy of  Religion.  Such  a  threefold 
cord,  wnich  binds  humanity  to  the  ideal, 
cannot  be  easily  or  quickly  severed."  (*-7) 

*— 5  Ladd— Philosophy  of  Conduct  P.  520 
*— 6  Taylor— The  Problem   of   Conduct, 

P.  241. 
*— 7  Ladd— Philosophy  of  Conduct,  P.  650 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


List  of  Works  consulted.     Those  quoted  are  marked  with  a  star. 


ABBOTT,  THOMAS  K. 
*BAIN,  ALEXANDER 
'BALDWIN,  J.  MARK, 


BENTHAM,  JEREMIAH, 
*BOWNE,  BORDEN  P. 

BRADLEY,  F.  H., 
*BROOKS,  EDWARD 
*BUTLER,  BISHOP  JOSEPH, 

CAIRO,  EDWARD 

CALDERWOOD,  HENRY 

CLARKE,  SAMUEL 

COUSIN 

DARWIN,  CHARLES 

DEWEY,  JOHN 

DEWEY  and  TUFTS 

FITE,  WARREN 

FALKENBERG,  RICHARD 
*FOWLER,  THOMAS 

GREEN,  F.  H., 
*HAVEN,  JOSEPH 

HIKOK,  LAURENS  P., 
HOBBES,  THOMAS 

*HOBHOUSE,  L.  T., 

HUTCHESON,  FRANCIS 

JANET 

JAMES,  WILLIAM 

*JOUFFROY 
*LADD,  GEORGE  T. 

LECKEY,  W.  E.  H. 
*LOCKE,  JOHN 

LOTZE,  HERMANN 

MACKENZIE,  A., 
'MACKINTOSH,  JAMES 

MANDEVILLE,  BERNARD  de 
*MARTINEAU,  JAMES 

McCOSH,  JAMES 

MILL,  JAMES  S., 
*MORRELL,  J.  D., 

MUIRHEAD,  J.  H., 

PAULSEN,  FRIEDERICH 

PLATO 


—The  Ethics  of  Kant. 

— Mental  and  Moral  Science. 

— Psychology. 

— Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations. 

—Dictionary  of  Philosophy. 

— The  Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation. 

—The  Principles  of  Ethics. 

—Ethical  Studies. 

— Mental  Science  and  Mental  Culture. 

— In  the  Analogy,  Dissertation  on  Virtue. 

—The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant. 

— Handbook  of  Moral  Philosophy. 

—The  Boyle  Lectures. 

—The  True,  the  Beautiful  and  the  Good. 

— The  Origin  of  Species. 

— Outlines  of  a  Critical  Theory  of  Ethics. 

—Ethics,  1908. 

— An  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Ethics. 

— A  History  of  Modern  Philosophy. 

— Progressive  Morality. 

— Prolegomena  to  Ethics. 

— Psychology. 

— Moral  Philosophy. 

— Moral  Science. 

— The  Leviathan 

— De  Corpore  Politico. 

— Morals  in  Evolution,  Theory  of  Knowl- 
edge. 

— System  of  Moral  Philosophy. 

—Theory  of  Morals. 

— Psychology. 

— Pragmatism. 

— Introduction  to  Ethics. 

— Philosophy  of  Conduct. 

— Psychology. 

— History  of  European  Morals. 

— Essay    Concerning    the    Human    Under- 
standing. 

— Practical  Philosophy 

— A  Manuel  of  Ethics. 

— Miscellaneous  Works. 

—The  Fable  of  the  Bees. 

—Types  of  Ethical  Theory. 

— The  Intuitions 

— Utilitarianism. 

— Modern  Philosophy. 

— The  Elements  of  Ethics. 
—A  System  of  Ethics. 
— Dialogues. 


POOLED    ' 
PORTER,  NOAH 
TRICE,  RICHARD 

'REID,  THOMAS 

'RILEY,  J.  WOODBRIDGE 
'ROYCE,  JOSIAH 


SELBY-BIGGE 

SETH,  JAMES 

*SIDGWICK,  H. 

SMITH,  ADAM 
*SPENCER,  HERBERT 


^STEPHEN,  LESLIE 
*  STEWART,  DUGALD 
^TAYLOR,  A.  E., 
UEBERWEG,  FRIEDERICH 
WATSON,  RICHARD 
WHEWELL,  WILLIAM 
WINDLEBAND,  W. 
WUNDT,  W. 
ZELLER,  E. 


—Indexes  of  Periodical  Literature. 
— The  Elements  of  Moral  Science. 
— Review  of  the  Chief  Questions  and  Dif- 
ficulties of  Morals 
— Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy. 
—Works. 

— American  Philosophy. 
— The  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy. 
— Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy. 
—The  World  and  the  Individual. 
—The  British  Moralists. 
— A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles. 
— History  of  Ethics. 
—The  Methods  of  Ethics. 
— Theory  of  the  Moral  Sentiments. 
— Principles  of  Ethics. 
— Justice. 

—The  Individual  Life. 
— Science  of  Ethics. 
— Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy. 
— The  Problems  of  Conduct. 
— A  History  of  Philosophy. 
— Theological  Institutes. 
— Elements  of  Morality. 
— A  History  of  Philosophy. 
—Ethics. 
— Socrates  and  the  Socratic  Schools. 


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